Research Article

The Historical Development of Jaina Pramāṇamīmāṃsā and A Comparative Study of The Pramāṇa Theories of The Major Indian Philosophical Systems

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Abstract :

This research paper studies the historical development of Jaina pramāṇamīmāṃsā and compares it with the pramāṇa systems of the major Indian philosophies. The basic question is how Jaina thinkers resolved the problem of the validity of knowledge, and where their solution coincides with, and where it diverges from, other traditions. The study is based on historical, text-analytical and comparative methods. There are four principal conclusions. **First,** Jaina pramāṇaśāstra developed in three stages: the āgamic fivefold classification of knowledge, the pratyakṣa-parokṣa division of the Tattvārthasūtra, and the logical turn of around the eighth century, in which, through Siddhasena Mahāmati and Akalaṅka, a new system of anumāna, hetu and saṃvyavahāra-pratyakṣa came in. **Second,** in the Jaina tradition the basis of the division of pramāṇas is not the source of knowledge but the immediacy of knowledge (sākṣāttā - with respect to dependence on the senses, etc.), for this very reason, in the original scheme sense-perception is 'parokṣa'. **Third,** the distinguishing feature of Jaina epistemology is the linking of pramāṇa with naya, anekānta and syādvāda, from which arises the doctrine of the many-sided nature of things and the relativity of statement. **Fourth,** on comparison with Buddhism, Nyāya, Sāṃkhya-Yoga, Mīmāṃsā, Vedānta and Cārvāka, the strength of the Jaina view appears in its integrative framework, and its limitations in the two-tiered character of saṃvyavahāra-pratyakṣa, the logical criticisms of syādvāda, and the historical dependence on Buddhist logic. The conclusion of the paper is that it is more appropriate to read Jaina pramāṇamīmāṃsā not merely as a sectarian doctrine, but as an active participant tradition in the dialogue of Indian epistemology.

Keywords: Jaina philosophy, Jaina Nyāya, pramāṇamīmāṃsā, Indian epistemology, pratyakṣa, parokṣa, anumāna, nayavāda, anekāntavāda, syādvāda.

Introduction:

The history of Indian philosophy is not merely a history of explanations of the self, the world, God and liberation, it is also a continuous examination of the question of how a human being can know reality and why he can trust his knowledge. Before accepting any metaphysical claim, one has to ask what knowledge is its basis and on what account that knowledge is valid. The systematic study of this very inquiry was called pramāṇamīmāṃsā or pramāṇaśāstra in the Indian tradition.

The word 'pramāṇa' is generally used for the means or process by which valid knowledge (pramā) arises. But the traditions are not unanimous on the definition of pramāṇa, its number and its scope. Some regard only pratyakṣa and anumāna as sufficient, some give the status of independent pramāṇa to śabda, upamāna, arthāpatti and anupalabdhi as well. This disagreement is not merely one of enumeration, behind it work different conceptions of knowledge, language, the being of things and truth.

The pramāṇamīmāṃsā of Jaina philosophy developed in this broad intellectual atmosphere. While analysing the nature of knowledge, Jaina thinkers also asked what the relation is between the standpoint of the knower, the object known and the language of statement. Their distinctiveness is that they do not keep the discussion of pramāṇa apart from the doctrine of the many dharmas of a thing, this is why anekāntavāda and nayavāda find a place within their epistemology.

A sūtra of the Tattvārthasūtra, the foundational text of the Jaina tradition, declares pramāṇa and naya to be the two means of tattvabodha (comprehension of reality). pramāṇanayair adhigamaḥ |[1] The significance of this sūtra is that it does not confine the problem of knowledge to any single means. It is also necessary to be cautious that pramāṇa and naya are not synonymous: pramāṇa is connected with the validity of knowledge and with the comprehensive grasp of a thing, whereas naya is a method of grasping some one aspect of a thing from a definite standpoint. The elaboration of this distinction is given in later sections.

Another caution is important in the historical study of Jaina Nyāya. The tradition has regarded Nyāyāvatāra as a work of Siddhasena Divākara. But according to the analysis of Balcerowicz (2001/2008, 2016), its author is probably Siddhasena Mahāmati, who lived around 710/720-770/780 CE, and who is different from Siddhasena Divākara, the author of the Sanmatitarka.[2] This distinction is necessary because the reconstruction of the

chronology of the Jaina logical tradition depends on it. The present paper proceeds, in accordance with this modern research conclusion, keeping the two ācāryas separate.

Literature Review :

Modern literature on Jaina pramāṇamīmāṃsā can be understood in three streams. The first stream is doctrinal-interpretive: Mookerjee (1944) tried to show the Jaina anekānta to be different from indeterminism, Matilal (1981) read anekāntavāda in the context of the nature of things and of statement, Indra Chandra Shastri (1990) and Sanghavi (1961) gave an integrated introduction to Jaina epistemology and logic. The second stream is text-critical and historical: Balcerowicz (2001/2008) presented a critical edition and comparative study of the Nyāyāvatāra and its commentaries, he (2016) analysed the change that came in Jaina epistemology in the eighth century by calling it a 'revolution', den Boer (2020) studied early Jaina epistemology in the philosophical chapters of the Tattvārthādhigama. The third stream is comparative, in which the collections of Matilal (1986) and Matilal-Evans (1986) provide a method of reading Indian epistemology in the context of the Buddhist and Nyāya traditions.

In Hindi, the introductions of Dalsukh Malvania on Jaina philosophy of the āgama period and the introductions relating to the edition of Hemacandra's Pramāṇamīmāṃsā are foundational. Even so, most studies are either written from within the Jaina tradition or compare only with one or two philosophies. The effort of the present paper is to place the historical sequence of development and comparison with many philosophies in a single framework, on equal comparative grounds.

Research Problem, Objectives and Methodology :-

Research Problem :

Many views developed in the Indian traditions on the nature of pramāṇa and the validity of knowledge. There are similarities among these views, but serious disagreements are also seen on the source of knowledge, the relation of knower and known, the being of things and the role of reasoning. The problem of the present research is: under what intellectual circumstances Jaina pramāṇamīmāṃsā developed, what the Jaina ācāryas gave to Indian logic, and in what way the Jaina pramāṇa system is similar to or different from other major philosophies.

Research Questions :

(1) How did a systematic pramāṇaśāstra develop out of the Jaina āgamic classification of knowledge? (2) What is the relation between pramāṇa and naya in Jaina philosophy? (3) What are the fundamental differences between the Jaina and Buddhist conceptions of pratyakṣa and anumāna? (4) What are the similarities and differences between the Jaina and Nyāya views on the validity of śabda/āgama? (5) In what way do anekāntavāda and nayavāda make Jaina epistemology distinctive? (6) What are the strength and limitation of the Jaina logical tradition?

Objectives and Hypothesis :

The objectives are: a chronological study of the development of Jaina pramāṇamīmāṃsā, analysis of the definition and classification of pramāṇa in the principal texts, evaluation of the contributions of Siddhasena, Samantabhadra, Akalaṅka, Vidyānanda, Vādideva and Hemacandra, among others, and comparison with other philosophies on equal grounds. Hypothesis: The distinctiveness of Jaina epistemology lies not in the number of pramāṇas, but in the basis of the classification of knowledge (sākṣāttā) and in the linking of pramāṇa with the structure of naya-anekānta.

Research Methodology :

The study combines historical, text-analytical, comparative and critical methods. By the historical method the chronology of the ācāryas and texts has been reconstructed, where the dating is disputed, the approximate period and the disagreement of scholars have been indicated. By the analytical method the definitions of concepts such as pramāṇa, pratyakṣa, anumāna, naya and āgama have been examined. In the comparative method all the philosophies have been placed on seven common criteria (Section 7). The purpose of the critical method is not to declare any philosophy superior, but to clarify its arguments, assumptions and limitations.

As primary sources, priority has been given to the original text of Sanskrit and Prakrit works. The full text of sūtras, kārikās and gāthās, the transliteration, the meaning and the textual reference are given in the endnotes, the main text contains only their analysis. Where editions of the text differ (especially in the Śvetāmbara and Digambara texts of the Tattvārthasūtra), this is indicated in the endnote. The translations and glosses are the author's own.

The Historical Development of Jaina Pramāṇamīmāṃsā :-

The Āgamic Basis: Five Kinds of Knowledge :

Jaina philosophy is an ancient philosophical tradition connected with the Indian śramaṇa tradition, in which systematic thought developed on questions such as jīva, ajīva, karma, bandha, mokṣa and knowledge. A methodological caution is necessary in historiography: traditional narratives, archaeological-literary evidence and the datings of modern scholars are not of the same level, so it is not appropriate to place them in one single category of evidence.

The early āgama literature enumerates knowledge in five kinds: ābhinibodhika (mati), śruta, avadhi, manaḥparyava and kevala. "ṇāṇaṃ paṃcavihaṃ paṇṇattaṃ, taṃ jahā-ābhiṇibohiyaṇāṇaṃ, suyaṇāṇaṃ, ohiṇāṇaṃ, maṇapajjavaṇāṇaṃ, kevalaṇāṇaṃ |" Meaning: Knowledge is said to be of five kinds: ābhinibodhika (mati), śruta, avadhi, manaḥparyava and kevala.[3] The purpose of this classification was not merely to give an intellectual list, it also showed the relation among knowledge, karmic covering and spiritual development. The more free of covering knowledge becomes, the more complete it is, and in kevalajñāna there is complete destruction of the covering. This early conception became the basis of the later discussion of pramāṇa, but questions such as the logical definition of 'pramāṇa', the structure of inference and replies to opposing views were not yet central in it.

The Tattvārthasūtra: The Transformation of Knowledge into Pramāṇa :

Umāsvāti (Umāsvāmī)'s Tattvārthasūtra is regarded as the first systematic work to bind in sūtra form almost all the major subjects of Jaina philosophy, and den Boer (2020) has read it in the context of the philosophical milieu of the Gupta period (approximately 300-600 CE). The first chapter begins with the exposition of the path to liberation, in which right faith, right knowledge and right conduct are harmonized. "samyagdarśanajñānacāritrāṇi mokṣamārgaḥ |" That is, right faith, right knowledge and right conduct - these (all three together) are the path to liberation.[4] In this context 'knowledge' is not mere acquisition of information but the right comprehension of reality, which is connected with the practice of liberation.

In the same chapter the five kinds are enumerated as knowledge, and immediately after, that very knowledge is called pramāṇa and divided into two classes: the first two (mati and śruta) are parokṣa and the remaining three (avadhi, manaḥparyaya, kevala) are pratyakṣa. "matiśrutāvadhimanaḥparyayakevalāni jñānam | tatpramāṇe | ādye parokṣam | pratyakṣam anyat ||"[5] This is the decisive contribution of the Tattvārthasūtra, because here the āgamic classification of knowledge and the pramāṇa-śāstric division connect with each other. Also, mati, smṛti, saṃjñā, cintā and abhinibodha are stated to be synonyms of one and the same field of knowledge, matiḥ smṛtiḥ saṃjñā cintābhinibodha ity anarthāntaram |[6] from which later ācāryas obtained the basis for explaining the parokṣa varieties such as smṛti, pratyabhijñāna and tarka.

A conceptual point deserves attention here. In the popular sense, knowledge arising through the senses and the mind is called 'pratyakṣa'. But in this original scheme that very matijñāna is 'parokṣa', because in it the self depends, for its knowledge, on media such as the senses and the mind. Pratyakṣa is that which arises directly from the self without these media. Therefore in Jaina philosophy the meaning of 'pratyakṣa' is fundamentally different from the 'sense-born knowledge' of the Buddhist or Nyāya tradition. This very difference was resolved by later ācāryas through the conception of saṃvyavahāra-pratyakṣa (Section 3.4).

Philosophical Works of the Ācāryas: Kundakunda, Siddhasena Divākara, Samantabhadra :

The period after the Tattvārthasūtra is in Jaina philosophy a period of debate with other schools. In the works of Kundakunda, knowledge is regarded as the nature of the self, and through the conception of naya two levels of the knowledge of the kevalin are stated: from the vyavahāra-naya the kevalin knows and sees everything, whereas from the niścaya-naya he knows and sees the self. This shows that in Jaina philosophy the explanation of knowledge was linked with naya from the beginning.[7]

jāṇadi passadi savvaṃ vavahāraṇaeṇa kevalī bhagavaṃ |
kevalaṇāṇī jāṇadi passadi ṇiyameṇa appāṇaṃ ||

Siddhasena Divākara's Sanmatitarka is the principal work of the philosophy of nayavāda and anekānta. One of its famous gāthās states that there are as many nayavādas as there are modes of statement, and as many parasamayas (other doctrines) as there are nayavādas.[8]

jāvaiyā vayaṇapahā tāvaiyā ceva hoṃti ṇayavāyā |
jāvaiyā ṇayavāyā tāvaiyā ceva parasamayā ||

At the end of the work, anekāntavāda is saluted as the doctrine without which even worldly practice does not function at all.[9]

jeṇa viṇā logassa vi vavahāro savvahā ṇa ṇivvaḍai |
tassa bhuvaṇekkaguruṇo ṇamo aṇegaṃtavāyassa ||

These statements show that here anekānta is not merely a doctrine of spirituality, but a principle of the structure of practice and knowledge.

Samantabhadra's Āptamīmāṃsā is an important link in this development, in which, in the context of the examination of āptatva, the argument for anekānta and syādvāda is given. One of its kārikās calls pramāṇa 'tattvajñāna' and, dividing knowledge into successive and non-successive forms, states it to be refined by syādvāda and naya,[10]

tattvajñānaṃ pramāṇaṃ te yugapat sarvabhāsanam |
kramabhāvi ca yaj jñānaṃ syādvādanayasaṃskṛtam ||

Another kārikā gives a logical basis to syādvāda by declaring a thing to be sat from the standpoint of its own nature (svarūpa), dravya, kṣetra, kāla and bhāva.[11]

sad eva sarvaṃ ko necchet svarūpādicatuṣṭayāt |
asad eva viparyāsān na cen na vyavatiṣṭhate ||

From the standpoint of the four beginning with svarūpa (svadravya, svakṣetra, svakāla, svabhāva), all things are indeed sat - who would not accept this? And from the opposite standpoint the same are asat, if this is not accepted, (the order of things) does not stand. The exact date of Samantabhadra is disputed, Balcerowicz has presented a new view on the relative chronology of Dharmakīrti and Samantabhadra, and therefore in this paper his period is stated only as 'approximately fifth-seventh century (disputed)'.

The Logical Turn of the Eighth Century: Siddhasena Mahāmati and Akalaṅka :

According to Balcerowicz (2016), in the eighth century a sudden decisive change came in Jaina epistemology, which he has called a 'revolution'. At the centre of this change are two ācāryas: Siddhasena Mahāmati, the author of the Nyāyāvatāra, and Akalaṅka. The first kārikā of the Nyāyāvatāra calls pramāṇa 'knowledge that illumines itself and the other, free from obstruction' and regards it as of two kinds, pratyakṣa and parokṣa.[12]

pramāṇaṃ svaparābhāsi jñānaṃ bādhavivarjitam |
pratyakṣaṃ ca parokṣaṃ ca dvidhā meyaviniścayāt ||

That is, pramāṇa is knowledge that illumines itself and others, free from obstruction. From the standpoint of the determination of the object (meya), it is of two kinds - pratyakṣa and parokṣa. This definition places together the self-illuminating character of knowledge, its grasp of the object and its non-discrepancy (avisaṃvāditā), which is comparable to the conception of avisaṃvādi knowledge current in Buddhist epistemology.

The most important logical novelty of this period is the definition of hetu. The Nyāyāvatāra states the characteristic of hetu to be 'anyathānupapannatva', anyathānupapannatvaṃ hetor lakṣaṇam īritam |[13] that is, the impossibility of the hetu without the sādhya. The tradition of Pātrasvāmī is said to lie behind this idea, which, against the Buddhist trairūpya-hetu, argues that where there is anyathānupapannatva, what need is there of three forms, and where it is absent, even the three forms are meaningless.[14]

anyathānupapannatvaṃ yatra tatra trayeṇa kim |
nānyathānupapannatvaṃ yatra tatra trayeṇa kim ||

In this way Jaina logic placed the validity of anumāna on the avinābhāva of hetu and sādhya, and entrusted the knowledge of that avinābhāva to the type of knowledge called 'tarka' (ūha).

Akalaṅka (c. 720-780) gave a two-level explanation of pratyakṣa. According to him, knowledge endowed with vaiśadya (clarity) is pratyakṣa, but it is of two kinds: mukhya pratyakṣa (supersensory knowledge arising directly from the self) and saṃvyavahāra-pratyakṣa (knowledge arising through the senses and mind from the standpoint of worldly practice).[15]

pratyakṣaṃ viśadaṃ jñānaṃ mukhyasaṃvyavahārataḥ |
parokṣaṃ śeṣavijñānaṃ pramāṇe iti saṅgrahaḥ ||

This solution does two things at once: on the one hand it saves the āgamic scheme of the Tattvārthasūtra, and on the other hand it also gives a place to the 'indriya-pratyakṣa' that is popularly current and accepted by Buddhist-Nyāya thought. Vidyānanda (c. 775-840) gave a detailed exposition and defence of these arrangements of Akalaṅka.

The Later Systematizers: From Māṇikyanandī to Yaśovijaya :

After the ninth-tenth century, independent textbooks on pramāṇa began to be composed in the Jaina tradition. Māṇikyanandī's Parīkṣāmukha, in sūtra style, calls pramāṇa 'determinative knowledge of oneself and of a previously unknown object',[16] svāpūrvārthavyavasāyātmakaṃ jñānaṃ pramāṇam | and divides parokṣa into smṛti, pratyabhijñāna, tarka, anumāna and āgama.[17] parokṣam itarat | pratyakṣādinimittaṃ smṛtipratyabhijñānatarkānumānāgamabhedam | Prabhācandra's (c. 980-1065) Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa is an extensive commentary on this. In the Śvetāmbara tradition Vādidevasūri's (1086-1169) Pramāṇanayatattvālokālaṃkāra calls pramāṇa 'knowledge that determines oneself and the other',[18] "svaparavyavasāyi jñānaṃ pramāṇam |" whereas Hemacandra's (c. 1088-1172) Pramāṇamīmāṃsā gives a

comparatively concise definition: right determination of the object alone is pramāṇa.[19] "samyagarthanirṇayaḥ pramāṇam |" In the seventeenth century Yaśovijaya's Jainatarkabhāṣā reconstructs this tradition in the Navya-Nyāya style.

Among these ācāryas there is also disagreement on the components of the definition of pramāṇa, especially on the question of whether or not to include the word 'apūrva' (anadhigata) in the definition, and on the necessity of the word 'svapara'. This disagreement shows that Jaina pramāṇaśāstra is not linear, but a tradition of living debate among sects and ācāryas. The principal stages are summarized in the table that follows.

Table 1: Principal Stages in the Development of Jaina Pramāṇamīmāṃsā (Periods Approximate and in Many Places Disputed)

Ācārya / Work	Approximate Period	Contribution to Pramāṇamīmāṃsā
Āgama tradition (Nandīsūtra, etc.)	Early	Fivefold knowledge, initial pratyakṣa-parokṣa distinction
Umāsvāti, Tattvārthasūtra	Gupta period (disputed)	Calling knowledge pramāṇa, mati-śruta parokṣa and the remaining three pratyakṣa, adhigama through pramāṇa and naya
Kundakunda	Early centuries (disputed)	Knowledge as the nature of the self, explanation of kevalajñāna through the vyavahāra and niścaya nayas
Siddhasena Divākara, Sanmatitarka	c. 5th century (disputed)	Philosophical expansion of naya and anekānta
Samantabhadra, Āptamīmāṃsā	c. 5th-7th century (disputed)	Āpta-parīkṣā, logical basis of syādvāda and pramāṇa
Siddhasena Mahāmati, Nyāyāvatāra	c. 710/720-770/780	Svaparābhāsi definition of pramāṇa, anyathānupapannatva, dialogue with Buddhist logic
Akalaṅka	c. 720-780	Mukhya and saṃvyavahāra pratyakṣa, validity of tarka, systematization of the varieties of parokṣa
Vidyānanda	c. 775-840	Exposition and defence of the Akalaṅkan system
Māṇikyanandī, Parīkṣāmukha	c. 9th-10th century	Sūtra-form definition of pramāṇa, five varieties of parokṣa
Prabhācandra	c. 980-1065	Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa: extensive commentary on the Parīkṣāmukha
Vādidevasūri	1086-1169	Pramāṇanayatattvālokālaṃkāra, Syādvādaratnākara
Hemacandra, Pramāṇamīmāṃsā	c. 1088-1172	Concise, well-organized pramāṇa text (available incomplete)
Yaśovijaya, Jainatarkabhāṣā	1624-1688	Reconstruction of Jaina logic in the Navya-Nyāya style

The Pramāṇa Systems of the Major Indian Philosophies :

To understand the distinctiveness of Jaina pramāṇamīmāṃsā, a brief but original-text-based introduction to the systems of the other philosophies is necessary. The aim here is not merely which philosophy accepts how many pramāṇas, but how it establishes the validity of knowledge.

Buddhist Pramāṇamīmāṃsā :

In the Buddhist tradition Dignāga reorganized the entire discussion of pramāṇa by holding only pratyakṣa and anumāna to be pramāṇa.[20]

pratyakṣam anumānaṃ ca pramāṇaṃ hi dvilakṣaṇam |
prameyaṃ tatprayogārtha na pramāṇāntaraṃ bhavet ||

Dharmakīrti, carrying this scheme forward, called pramāṇa 'avisaṃvādi knowledge', whose criterion is success in arthakriyā.[21]

pramāṇam avisaṃvādi jñānam arthakriyāsthitiḥ |
avisaṃvādanaṃ śābde 'py abhiprāyanivedanāt ||

His definition of pratyakṣa is knowledge that is 'kalpanāpoḍha and abhrānta',[22] "tatra pratyakṣaṃ kalpanāpoḍham abhrāntam |" that is, knowledge in which there is no conceptual construction of name, class and so on and which is not erroneous. The relation of Buddhist pramāṇaśāstra to the Jaina tradition is deep and dialectical. Balcerowicz holds that many logical arrangements of Jaina epistemology are to a great extent based on the legacy of Buddhist logic, while the Jaina ācāryas at the same time oppose it. The fundamental difference lies in the conception of the being of things: the Buddhist tradition, in accordance with kṣaṇikavāda, regards pratyakṣa as svalakṣaṇa-grāhī and anumāna as sāmānya-grāhī, whereas the Jaina view, regarding the thing as nitya-anitya (utpāda-vyaya-dhrauvya), connects pramāṇa with the grasp of the thing as sāmānya-viśeṣa-ubhayātmaka.

Nyāya Philosophy :

Nyāya philosophy accepts four pramāṇas: pratyakṣa, anumāna, upamāna and śabda.[23] "**pratyakṣānumānopamānaśabdāḥ pramāṇāni |**" In the definition of pratyakṣa the Nyāyasūtra includes knowledge that is produced from the contact of sense and object, is avyapadeśya, avyabhicārī and vyavasāyātmaka.[24] "**indriyārthasannikarṣotpannaṃ jñānam avyapadeśyam avyabhicāri vyavasāyātmakaṃ pratyakṣam |**" Here pramāṇa is classified on the basis of the producing causes of knowledge, which is a different view from the Jaina classification. The validity of śabda in Nyāya rests on the reliability of the āpta, which is comparable to the Jaina āgama's discussion of āptatā (vītarāgatā, sarvajñatā), although the basis of Nyāya's āptatā is different.

Vaiśeṣika Philosophy :

In the Vaiśeṣika tradition, from the early period pratyakṣa and laiṅgika (anumāna) were regarded as the principal means, and in Praśastapāda's bhāṣya other means such as śabda are included in anumāna.[25] "**śabdādīnām apy anumāne 'ntarbhāvaḥ samānavidhitvāt |**" In the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition the doctrines of both philosophies merged, so it is necessary to keep a distinction between early Vaiśeṣika and developed Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. In comparison with Jaina philosophy, the conceptions of dravya, guṇa, sāmānya-viśeṣa and samavāya are decisive, because disagreement on the nature of things directly affects the theory of the object of pramāṇa.

Sāṃkhya and Yoga :

dṛṣṭam anumānam āptavacanaṃ ca sarvapramāṇasiddhatvāt |
trividhaṃ pramāṇam iṣṭaṃ prameyasiddhiḥ pramāṇād dhi ||

Sāṃkhya accepts three pramāṇas: dṛṣṭa (pratyakṣa), anumāna and āptavacana.[26] In the Yogasūtra too, pratyakṣa, anumāna and āgama are called pramāṇas.[27] "**pratyakṣānumānāgamāḥ pramāṇāni |**" Here the enumeration of pramāṇas is smaller than the five parokṣa-varieties of the Jaina, but the view of classification on the basis of the source of knowledge is close to Nyāya. In comparison with the Jaina, the basis of the validity of āgama and the nature of anumāna are of special importance.

Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta :

In Pūrvamīmāṃsā the validity of the Veda and the sphere of inquiry into dharma-knowledge are central, according to the sūtra, the characteristic of dharma is codanā (Vedic injunction).[28] "**codanālakṣaṇo 'rtho dharmaḥ |**" Within Mīmāṃsā there is disagreement on the number of pramāṇas: in the tradition the Prabhākara school accepts five and the Kumārila school six pramāṇas. In the Vedānta traditions the validity of śruti is regarded as the basis of brahmajñāna,[29] "**śāstrayonitvāt |**" and in later prakriyā texts of Advaita six pramāṇas are enumerated: pratyakṣa, anumāna, upamāna, āgama, arthāpatti and anupalabdhi.[30] But it is not appropriate to apply this classification equally to all Vedānta sects.

Cārvāka Philosophy :

Cārvāka/Lokāyata is generally regarded as a tradition in which pratyakṣa predominates, and its criticism of the validity of anumāna is important in the history of Indian pramāṇaśāstra. But its original texts are largely unavailable, so the reconstruction of its doctrine often depends on the accounts of opposing ācāryas, it is necessary to keep this source-problem in mind.[31] Jayarāśi's Tattvopaplavasiṃha goes even further than this and conducts a metaphysical examination of pramāṇas themselves, and for this reason it is a special challenge for the Jaina ācāryas, who regard the establishment of pramāṇa as necessary - "athātas tattvopaplavaṃ vyākhyāsyāmaḥ |"[32]

The Structure of the Jaina Pramāṇa Doctrine :-

The Definition of Pramāṇa :

The Jaina ācāryas gave many definitions of pramāṇa, in which certain components recur: (a) knowledge alone is pramāṇa, (b) it is self-illuminating, (c) it determines the other object (viṣaya), and (d) it is free from obstruction or discrepancy (visaṃvāda). Māṇikyanandī adds the word 'apūrva', whereas the definitions of Vādideva and Hemacandra are comparatively concise (Section 3.5). Two things emerge from these definitions. First, the Jaina tradition regards knowledge as both the instrument of pramāṇa and itself pramāṇa, in it the distinction between 'jñāna' and 'pramāṇa' is made not by the enumeration of causal factors such as the senses, but by the valid state of knowledge. Second, the qualifier 'svaparavyavasāyi' puts forward the claim that knowledge knows itself too, this is close to the Buddhist conception of svasaṃvedana and different from the view of the Naiyāyikas that regards knowledge as grasped through anuvyavasāya.

Pratyakṣa and Parokṣa :

The basis of the Jaina division is not the source of knowledge but immediacy (sākṣāttā). Knowledge that arises from the self without an external medium is pratyakṣa, that which arises through the medium of the senses, mind, liṅga or śabda is parokṣa. From this standpoint avadhi, manaḥparyaya and kevala are pāramārthika (mukhya) pratyakṣa, and mati and śruta are parokṣa. The logical inconvenience of this scheme was that worldly practice and other philosophies call sense-born knowledge pratyakṣa. Akalaṅka's saṃvyavahāra-pratyakṣa is the solution to precisely this inconvenience: sense-knowledge is pratyakṣa in worldly practice and parokṣa from the ultimate standpoint (paramārthataḥ). This two-tieredness is both a strength (integration) and a complexity (difference of terminology) of Jaina epistemology.

Varieties of Parokṣa and Anumāna :

In the scheme of the Parīkṣāmukha, parokṣa knowledge is of five kinds: smṛti, pratyabhijñāna, tarka, anumāna and āgama. Smṛti arises from the saṃskāra of a past experience, pratyabhijñāna is knowledge arising by joining together, as in 'this is that same' or 'this is similar to that', tarka (ūha) gives the knowledge of vyāpti, anumāna, on the basis of that same vyāpti, brings about the knowledge of the sādhya, and āgama is knowledge born of the words of an āpta.

The most distinctive point of Jaina logic is to regard tarka as an independent variety of pramāṇa. The Buddhist and Naiyāyika traditions resolve the problem of the knowledge of vyāpti through pratyakṣa and anupalambha, or through some process of anumāna itself, the Jaina ācāryas establish a separate cognitive process for this. Along with this, the characterization of hetu as 'anyathānupapannatva' (Section 3.4) completes the same logical framework: the validity of anumāna rests not on three-form conditions but on the impossibility of the hetu without the sādhya.

The Question of Prāmāṇya :

On the question of the origin (utpatti) and cognition (jñapti) of prāmāṇya there is a fundamental division among the Indian traditions: Mīmāṃsā supports svataḥ prāmāṇya, Nyāya paratas prāmāṇya. The Jaina ācāryas, especially the tradition of the Parīkṣāmukha, give a middle solution to this: the origin of prāmāṇya is regarded as paratas (from the qualities of the causes), but its cognition may be svataḥ in the state of familiarity and paratas in the state of unfamiliarity.[33] This solution denies exclusive svataḥ or paratas prāmāṇya and accords with the method of anekānta.

Naya, Anekānta and Syādvāda: The Auxiliary Structure of Pramāṇa :-

The Metaphysical Basis of Anekānta :

The metaphysical basis of Jaina epistemology is the position that a thing is endowed with utpāda, vyaya and dhrauvya.[34] "**utpādavyayadhrauvyayuktaṃ sat |**" A thing is not exclusively permanent or impermanent, it is enduring in its dravya-form and changing in its paryāya-form. For this very reason the many dharmas of one and the same thing, from different standpoints, can coexist without being mutually contradictory. A sūtra of the Tattvārthasūtra states this in the language of standpoint: that from different standpoints the principal or subordinate form of a thing is established - "**arpitānarpitasiddheḥ |**"[35]

The Nature of Naya and Its Relation to Pramāṇa :

Naya is a method of grasping some one dharma of a thing from a particular standpoint, without negating the remaining dharmas. In the Digambara text the Tattvārthasūtra enumerates seven nayas named naigama, saṃgraha, vyavahāra, ṛjusūtra, śabda, samabhirūḍha and evambhūta.[36]

"**naigamasaṃgrahavyavahārarjusūtraśabdasamabhirūḍhaivambhūtā nayāḥ |**" For example, a pot may be seen on the basis of its substance, its present shape, its use or its process of making, each view is right, but incomplete. A naya becomes false (mithyā) when it makes its own side the whole truth and begins to negate the other sides. The relation of pramāṇa and naya can be understood thus: pramāṇa is the sakala (comprehensive) cognition of a thing, whereas naya is vikala (partial) cognition. On this basis the ācāryas explained sakalādeśa and vikalādeśa, which is the principal subject of the commentaries on the Tattvārthasūtra (1.6). It also becomes clear from this that anekāntavāda does not mean that 'all views are equally true'. The validity of a standpoint depends on its object, standpoint and purpose. For this very reason in the Sanmatitarka the plurality of nayavādas is connected with the plurality of parasamayas, but their harmonization is regarded as the function of anekāntavāda.

Syādvāda and Saptabhaṅgī :

Syādvāda is the linguistic expression of anekāntavāda. 'Syāt' means not doubt or possibility but 'from some standpoint'. Seven kinds of statement are held possible about a dravya: syād asti, syān nāsti, syād asti-nāsti, syād avaktavya, syād asti-avaktavya, syān nāsti-avaktavya and syād asti-nāsti-avaktavya. This saptabhaṅgī-formula is found as a Prakrit gāthā in the works of Kundakunda.[37]

siya atthi ṇatthi uhayaṃ avvattavvaṃ puṇo ya tattidayaṃ |
davvaṃ khu sattabhaṃgaṃ ādesavaseṇa saṃbhavadi ||

In the saptabhaṅgī each statement is regulated by 'eva', so that it is not indefinite but remains conditioned by standpoint and definite. It should be noted that saptabhaṅgī is not, like the Buddhist catuṣkoṭi, a system of 'negation of the koṭis'. It is a system of enumeration of the valid standpoints of statement. At the same time it brings the problem of pramāṇa to the level of language: the kevalin's total knowledge is sakala in experience, but in language all the dharmas of a thing cannot be stated at one time together, and therefore language is naya-dependent and conditioned by standpoint.

Comparative Analysis :-

The Seven Criteria :

The following seven criteria have been chosen for comparison: (1) the number of pramāṇas, (2) the basis of classification, (3) the conception of pratyakṣa, (4) the nature of anumāna and hetu, (5) the validity of śabda/āgama, (6) the theory of prāmāṇya, and (7) the conception of the being of things.

Table 2: Comparative Summary of the Pramāṇa Systems of the Major Indian Philosophies

Darśana	Number of Pramāṇas	Principal Feature	Difference from the Jaina View
Jaina	Two basic (pratyakṣa, parokṣa), five varieties of parokṣa	Division on the basis of immediacy (sākṣāttā), linked with naya-anekānta	---
Buddhist (Dignāga-Dharmakīrti)	Two: pratyakṣa, anumāna	Pratyakṣa that is kalpanāpoḍha and abhrānta, avisaṃvāda based on arthakriyā	Based on kṣaṇikavāda, āgama not an independent pramāṇa, tarka not independent
Nyāya	Four: pratyakṣa, anumāna, upamāna, śabda	Pratyakṣa based on indriya-artha-sannikarṣa, classification on the basis of source	Regarding indriya-pratyakṣa directly as pratyakṣa, upamāna independent
Vaiśeṣika	Generally two: pratyakṣa, laiṅgika	Inclusion of śabda, etc. in anumāna	Analysis of objects based on dravya-guṇa-samavāya
Sāṃkhya	Three: pratyakṣa, anumāna, āptavacana	Pramā-system in accordance with the puruṣa-prakṛti dualism	Knowledge is a modification of buddhi, not of the self
Yoga	Three: pratyakṣa, anumāna, āgama	Pramāṇa as a citta-vṛtti	Knowledge in the context of vṛtti-nirodha

Darśana	Number of Pramāṇas	Principal Feature	Difference from the Jaina View
Mīmāṃsā	Five or six (Prabhākara/Kumārila)	Svataḥ prāmāṇya of the Veda, apauruṣeyatva	Validity of āgama rests on the āpta, not on the apauruṣeyatva of the Veda
Advaita Vedānta	Six (in later prakriyā texts)	Brahmajñāna through the śruti-pramāṇa	The ultimate reality is one, plurality of things is vyāvahārika
Cārvāka	One: pratyakṣa	Denial of the validity of anumāna	Denial of both tarka and āgama

Analysis :

(a) Number versus basis. In the number of pramāṇas the Jaina view stops at two, while the Buddhist too stops at two, this numerical similarity is misleading. The Buddhist twofold division arises from the twofold nature of the prameya (svalakṣaṇa and sāmānyalakṣaṇa), the Jaina twofold division arises from the immediacy of knowledge. The bases of the two are different, this is why in the Jaina 'parokṣa' come such varieties as smṛti, tarka and āgama which the Buddhist does not regard as independent pramāṇas.

(b) Pratyakṣa. In Nyāya pratyakṣa is knowledge produced by indriya-sannikarṣa, in Buddhism it is knowledge free of conceptual construction and non-erroneous, in Jainism it is knowledge free of dependence (direct cognition by the self, ātma-sākṣāt). Through saṃvyavahāra-pratyakṣa the Jaina view also gives a place to the popular meaning, but this distinction of 'mukhya' and 'saṃvyavahāra' also becomes a structural complexity of the Jaina tradition itself.

(c) Anumāna. The Buddhist regards hetu as trirūpa, Nyāya moves towards pañcarūpa or the five-membered syllogism (pañcāvayava), the Jaina regards anyathānupapannatva as the sole regulator of hetu and calls tarka a separate variety of pramāṇa for the knowledge of vyāpti. This is a trade-off between structural simplicity and epistemological cost: the validity of anumāna rests on a simpler criterion, but the burden of proving the independent validity of tarka increases.

(d) Śabda/Āgama. In Nyāya śabda is āptopadeśa, in Sāṃkhya āptavacana, in Mīmāṃsā the apauruṣeya word of the Veda, in Jainism āgama is the word of the āpta, and the āpta is one who is vītarāga-sarvajña. Thus the basis of the validity of the Jaina āgama is the faultlessness of the speaker, and not the apauruṣeyatva of the text. This view is close to Nyāya-Sāṃkhya and different from Mīmāṃsā.

(e) Prāmāṇya. Mīmāṃsā's exclusive svataḥ prāmāṇya and Nyāya's exclusive paratas prāmāṇya differ from the Jaina composite (ubhayātmaka) solution (Section 5.4). On this criterion the Jaina view shows a direct application of the method of anekānta.

(f) Being of things. The Buddhist holds kṣaṇikavāda, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika a divided acceptance of nitya and anitya substances, Vedānta one supreme reality, and the Jaina a thing that is utpāda-vyaya-dhrauvyātmaka. This very difference in the being of things is reflected in the theory of the object of pramāṇa, therefore it is not possible to read pramāṇaśāstra cut off from metaphysics.

(g) Pramāṇa and naya. Naya has no direct equivalent in other traditions, although the conceptions of levels of truth in Buddhism and Vedānta (saṃvṛti-paramārtha, vyavahāra-paramārtha) are comparable at some distance. In Jainism there is no difference of level but a difference of standpoint: no view is lower or higher, it is merely partial and incomplete.

Similarities and Debts :

The points of similarity are also important. Both Jaina and Buddhist regard the self-illuminating character of knowledge and avisaṃvāda as central to pramāṇa, both Jaina and Nyāya accept āptavacana as pramāṇa, both Jaina and Sāṃkhya accept various varieties of parokṣa knowledge. On the question of logical debt, the conclusion of Balcerowicz (2016) is that the eighth-century Jaina logical development arose from deep dialogue with Buddhist epistemology, but to call dialogue imitation too would be misleading, because the Jaina ācāryas reorganized those very tools within their own anekānta framework.

Critical Evaluation :

Strengths. (a) Jaina pramāṇaśāstra joins knowledge, thing and language in one framework, an equivalent of this comprehensiveness is rarely found in the Indian tradition. (b) The distinction of pramāṇa and naya makes clear the different roles of partial and comprehensive knowledge, which provides a basis for a logically regulated

tolerance toward differences of views. (c) Anyathānupapannatva-based anumāna and the independent validity of tarka are contributions to Indian logic.

Limitations and objections. (a) The two-tieredness of saṃvyavahāra-pratyakṣa makes terminology complex, calling sense-knowledge 'paramārthataḥ parokṣa' seems awkward to other traditions. (b) One of the oldest criticisms of syādvāda is that of Vedānta: a sūtra of the Brahmasūtra argues the impossibility of contradictory dharmas in one and the same thing, and Śaṅkara develops it at length in his bhāṣya.[38] "naikasminn asambhavāt |" The Jaina reply is that contradiction arises only when contradictory dharmas are stated from one and the same standpoint, there is no contradiction in different standpoints. This reply is reasonable, but the question of the enumeration of standpoints and the criterion of their selection remains. (c) Many tools of the Jaina logical tradition are inspired by Buddhist logic, so caution is needed on the distinction between the 'original' and the 'dialogical' contribution of the Jaina. (d) The basis of āgama-prāmāṇya is the omniscience of the āpta, which is difficult to prove by reasoning that is itself independent of the omniscient, the challenge of sceptical traditions such as Cārvāka and Jayarāśi is direct here.

Limitations of the research. This paper is based on selected sūtras and kārikās of the principal texts, a complete analysis of the detailed commentary-level arguments of Akalaṅka, Vidyānanda and Prabhācandra, and of the direct textual passages of the Jaina-Buddhist debate, has not been possible in it. A close matching of the Digambara and Śvetāmbara textual variants at all places is also a task for the future.

Conclusion :

The conclusions of the study are as follows. First, the development of Jaina pramāṇamīmāṃsā took place in three stages: from the āgamic fivefold knowledge to the pratyakṣa-parokṣa division of the Tattvārthasūtra, and then, through the logical turn of the eighth century, to the systematic textual tradition of the Parīkṣāmukha-Pramāṇamīmāṃsā period. Second, the basis of the Jaina division is sākṣāttā, therefore the position of indriya-pratyakṣa is fundamentally different from other philosophies, and saṃvyavahāra-pratyakṣa is the bridge connecting this difference with worldly practice. Third, the anyathānupapannatva-hetu, the independent validity of tarka and the svaparavyavasāyi characterization of pramāṇa are Jaina contributions to Indian logic. Fourth, naya, anekānta and syādvāda are not doctrines separate from pramāṇa but its auxiliary structure, and this is the most distinctive identity of Jaina epistemology. Fifth, from the comparative standpoint the Jaina view is close to the Buddhist in number and most different in the basis of classification, its limitations are seen in the complexity of saṃvyavahāra-pratyakṣa, the criticisms of syādvāda and the historical dependence on Buddhist logic.

From these conclusions it is established that it is inadequate to call Jaina pramāṇamīmāṃsā merely a sectarian doctrine. It is an active participant in that many-sided dialogue of Indian epistemology in which every tradition fashions its own position by listening to its pūrvapakṣa.

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[9]. Siddhasena Divākara, Sanmatitarka 3.69
[10]. Samantabhadra, Āptamīmāṃsā, kārikā 101
[11]. Samantabhadra, Āptamīmāṃsā, kārikā 15
[12]. Siddhasena Mahāmati (in the tradition, Siddhasena Divākara), Nyāyāvatāra 1
[13]. Siddhasena Mahāmati, Nyāyāvatāra 22 (first half)
[14]. Traditionally known as a kārikā of Pātrasvāmī (Pātrakesarī); cited by Śāntarakṣita, Tattvasaṃgraha (in the context of kārikā 1364) and by Vādidevasūri.
[15]. Akalaṅka, Laghīyastraya, kārikā 3
[16]. Māṇikyanandī, Parīkṣāmukha 1.1
[17]. Māṇikyanandī, Parīkṣāmukha, third samuddeśa, sūtra 1–2
[18]. Vādidevasūri, Pramāṇanayatattvālokālaṃkāra 1.2
[19]. Hemacandra, Pramāṇamīmāṃsā 1.1.2
[20]. Dignāga, Pramāṇasamuccaya 1.2
[21]. Dharmakīrti, Pramāṇavārttika (Pramāṇasiddhi-pariccheda) 2.1
[22]. Dharmakīrti, Nyāyabindu 1.4
[23]. Nyāyasūtra 1.1.3
[24]. Nyāyasūtra 1.1.4
[25]. Praśastapāda, Padārthadharmasaṃgraha (anumāna-prakaraṇa)
[26]. Īśvarakṛṣṇa, Sāṃkhyakārikā 4
[27]. Patañjali, Yogasūtra 1.7 (Samādhipāda)
[28]. Jaimini, Mīmāṃsāsūtra 1.1.2
[29]. Bādarāyaṇa, Brahmasūtra 1.1.3
[30]. Dharmarājādhvarīndra, Vedāntaparibhāṣā (first pariccheda)
[31]. Primary sources for the account of Cārvāka: Mādhava, Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha (Cārvāka chapter); collected fragments of the Bṛhaspati-sūtra.
[32]. Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa, Tattvopaplavasiṃha (beginning of the work)
[33]. Māṇikyanandī, Parīkṣāmukha 1.13 and Prabhācandra's relevant exposition in the Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa
[34]. Umāsvāti, Tattvārthasūtra 5.29 (Śvetāmbara text)/5.30 (Digambara text)
[35]. Umāsvāti, Tattvārthasūtra 5.31 (Śvetāmbara text)/5.32 (Digambara text)
[36]. Umāsvāti, Tattvārthasūtra 1.33 (Digambara text)
[37]. Kundakunda, Pravacanasāra 2.23; the same gāthā in Pañcāstikāya 14
[38]. Bādarāyaṇa, Brahmasūtra 2.2.33 and Śāṅkarabhāṣya