Research Article

Sentinel Chain: An Ai-Powered Prompt Injection Firewall With Blockchain-Based Threat Intelligence Sharing

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Abstract:

SentinelChain is an artificial intelligence-based framework for the detection, classification, and mitigation of malicious prompts in LLM-integrated applications. The framework leverages DistilBERT-based machine learning along with a rule-based analysis in order to recognize prompt injection attacks and increase the accuracy of detecting security-sensitive prompts. The framework includes context-aware harmful-content detection in order to distinguish malicious prompts targeting specific individuals from legitimate and non-malicious contextual requests and avoid blocking legitimate prompts. SentinleChainanalyzes incoming prompts, identifies prompt injection and harmful content patterns, and automatically blocks detected malicious prompts while allowing safe prompts to proceed further. SentinelChaingenerates a cryptographic signature for each threat and uses it in combination with the blockchain-based threat registry in order to ensure verification and integrity of threat information and also includes API-based threat storage and retrieval in order to store detected threats and verify them via the threat registry later on. This new technique has been deployed and evaluated using the live system.

Keywords: Prompt Injection, Large Language Models, DistilBERT, Contextual Detection, Machine Learning, Cybersecurity, Blockchain, Threat Intelligence, Artificial Intelligence Firewall.

1. INTRODUCTION

The emergence of Artificial Intelligence (AI) technology has made possible the creation of intelligent systems that are able to analyze information, identify patterns, and make decisions automatically. The use of AI in cybersecurity has enabled these systems to recognize abnormal activities and detect any security risks. Due to the fact that AI-based applications become more and more interactive with end users and external information, ensuring the security of such systems becomes a vital task. Firewall serves as a security layer for an application when it communicates with inputs or activities that might be malicious or unauthorized. Generally, a firewall is utilized to control network traffic according to specific security rules. In the same way, the security principle can be applied to AI-based applications. It is possible to analyze the user prompts before they reach a LLM layer.

The blockchain technology is a decentralized and tamper-proof method for capturing and validating information. The features of transparency, traceability, and cryptography help in the maintenance of security-related information. In the context of cybersecurity, the use of the blockchain technology allows for the exchange of the threat information between various participants without depending fully on the centralized record. Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) sharing is the process of collection, analysis, storing, and exchanging of the information regarding identified cybersecurity threats. CTI sharing helps the participating organizations to learn from their past experiences of attacks and improve their security mechanisms. The fusion of the threat intelligence with the blockchain technology can be helpful for recording and sharing the security information.

The above-mentioned concepts are the base of the SentinelChain that uses AI-based prompt analysis, firewall-based threat prevention, blockchain-based threat validation, and threat intelligence sharing for protecting LLM-integrated applications from prompt injection attacks.

1.1 Background of Large Language Models (LLMs)

Large Language Models (LLMs) became a part of modern artificial intelligence systems and provided features of natural language understanding, text generation, question answering, code generation, summarization, and conversation. The integration of LLMs into applications with external tools, databases, APIs, and information retrieval systems allowed creating intelligent assistants and decision-support systems. But the usage of LLMs also brought new security issues since LLMs handle the instructions and content of unknown origin, coming either from untrusted users or external data. [1,2,3] . The problem of prompt injection is especially relevant

among these new security issues because it allows an attacker to create a special input to change the intended behavior of an LLM. These kinds of inputs may try to break predefined instructions, violate application restrictions, get some sensitive information, or manipulate application features. The issue gets even harder when the LLM applications process the external content, because the malicious instructions may be provided indirectly via documents, webpages, and any kind of retrieved information. [1,4,5,7,9,13,22] . But the security of LLM applications needs to have a security layer that could analyze the incoming prompts before their processing by the application. The effective security mechanism would need to identify not only the known malicious patterns but also consider the context of the request to allow legitimate requests to pass. That is why we created SentinelChain, which combines DistilBERT analysis, rule-based detection, and context-aware harmful-content detection as a security layer for LLM applications.



Fig1. Common security risks associated with Large Language Models.

1.2 Security Challenges in LLM-Integrated Applications

Applications that integrate large language models (LLMs) become more and more connected to external software, databases, APIs, documents, and sources of information. On one hand, integration increases functionality of AI-based systems but on the other hand, it brings extra security vulnerabilities, as a model could process instructions and content from external sources that could be considered as untrusted. A malicious actor may use these interactions for manipulating LLM, bypassing application's limitations, obtaining any kind of information or performing unauthorized actions. [1,2,3] . One of the main issues is prompt injection when special instructions could be used for overriding the instructions of an application. The injection could be performed either directly by a user through an application's interface or indirectly via external sources such as web pages, documents, emails or other retrieved information. Besides, jailbreak attacks may be performed for bypassing the restrictions of an LLM, and sensitive-information extraction attacks might be attempted for gaining access to system instructions, credentials or other confidential information. [2,3,4] . The other issue is separating malicious content from legitimate content with security-related or harmful-looking words. For instance, a person might explain the technique of attack within his or her academic research or cybersecurity training without intention of conducting any attack. Security mechanism that will use only keyword search may mistakenly restrict the request. Thus, security mechanisms should take into account not only suspicious words but also the meaning of a prompt. Several existing works have focused on various methods of dealing with the mentioned challenges through the use of rule-based filtering, machine learning-based classification, instruction detection, and multi-step security methods. But certain limitations can be introduced by attacks that change

wording or where some keywords might be used both in malicious and legitimate prompts. Thus, there is a need for an additional security layer that would integrate various detection methods and make an enforcement decision based on the analysis of the prompt. [1,2,3] . In order to deal with the aforementioned challenges, SentinelChain employs DistilBERT-based analysis and rule-based detection along with context-aware harmful content detection. This approach analyses prompts before further processing, automatically detects malicious prompt injections, blocks them, and allows safe prompts. In case of any detected threats, a threat signature is created and included into the blockchain-based registry of the threat data by SentinelChain.

Table1. Security challenges and their potential impacts on LLM application

Security challenge	Potential impact
Prompt injection	Manipulation of model instructions
Indirect prompt injection	Malicious instructions from external content
Jailbreak attempts	Bypassing intended safety restrictions
Sensitive information extraction	Exposure of confidential data
Unauthorized tool interaction	Misuse of connected tools or APIs

1.3 Prompt Injection Attacks

Prompt injection is one of the main threats to the security of LLM-based applications. In case of prompt injection, an attacker creates an input with the instructions to control the behavior of the language model and the application itself. Instead of following the instructions given by the application, the model interprets the maliciously created input as a command to follow. Thus, the result may lead to the manipulation of the instructions, breaking of the safety policies, leaking of sensitive information, and performing the action itself. [1,2,3] .There are two types of prompt injection attacks. First of all, there is a direct prompt injection. In such an attack, the attacker delivers a malicious input through the input interface of the application. The examples of the malicious instructions include instructions to ignore previously delivered instructions, to show the hidden system instructions, or bypass restrictions. As the malicious input is sent directly from the attacker to the application, such an attack tries to influence the model during the standard interaction with it. [1,2]. Secondly, there is an indirect prompt injection attack. In such an attack, the attacker places a malicious input into some kind of content provided by an external source. The examples of such content include webpages, documents, e-mails, knowledge retrieved from the internet, etc. As the LLM application receives this content and gives it to the model, the instructions may be taken as commands, not as untrusted information. Thus, the indirect prompt injection attack is especially relevant for LLM-based applications. [3,4]




Fig2. Primary Type of Prompt injection

The attack surface may be expanded using various means like instruction override, jailbreaking attempts, role manipulation, and sensitive-information extraction. Attackers might change the text and structure of prompts to evade easy detection based on keywords. TThis implies that security measures that are based on static rules alone can fail to protect against different versions of attacks. [2,3,5] . Also, the use of security-related words does not necessarily mean that the prompt is malicious. For instance, a prompt describing how to perform prompt injection for cybersecurity purposes may include phrases like “ignore previous instructions” and still be used for learning purposes. This makes it necessary to determine whether a particular phrase is used in a harmful context. In order to counter these challenges, SentinelChain utilizes prompt analysis via DistilBERT, rule-based and context-aware harmful-content detection methods. The platform will analyze incoming prompts and block any verified malicious prompt injections automatically while letting through verified safe prompts. In case of a threat, SentinelChain will create a cryptographic threat signature and include the threat details into the blockchain-based threat registry.

1.4 Motivation of the Research

The fast implementation of large language models in different types of applications, like intelligent assistants, automated information systems, and tool-enabled AI systems, made it necessary to ensure the protection of such applications against prompt injection attacks. Such attacks aim at manipulation of the instructions followed by an LLM and may lead to some undesired model behavior, information disclosure, and the use of resources available to the connected application. The ability of attackers to change the wording and the structure of their prompts additionally complicates prompt injection detection based on security rules. [1,2,3]. Existing security solutions for prompt injection include rule-based filtering, machine learning-based detection, instruction analysis, and multi-stage security solutions. All of them illustrate the importance of prompt analysis prior to its transmission to the underlying language model.It is important to consider the context in which each prompt is given as well as the phrases' semantics, because terms that could be considered potential threats would also be used in legitimate educational, scientific, and cybersecurity discussions. [2,3,4]. Another motivation for SentinelChain development is the need for reliable threat information management. Prompt injection detection is only one step in the process of security protection. Threats have to be stored for future reference, verification, and threat intelligence usage. Conventional threat storing methods can be very useful for creating valuable records, but there exists also the opportunity of using blockchain-based registry for this purpose. [5,6]. Thus, according to these requirements, SentinelChain was developed as an AI-powered prompt injection firewall that uses DistilBERT-based analysis, rule-based detection, and context-aware harmful content detection. In order to analyze each prompt, the system creates a decision to either block the verified malicious prompt or allow the verified harmless prompt to pass through. As far as threats are concerned, the system creates cryptographic threat signatures and uses them to integrate threat information into a blockchain-based registry. In conclusion, the motivation for this framework can be formulated as the necessity of intelligent prompt analysis, context-aware security decisions, automated prompt blocking, and threat information management within one security framework. SentinelChain extends the level of prompt security by adding the threat signature creation and API-based threat storage and retrieval to the detection process.

1.5 Research Objectives

The primary objective of the SentinelChain project is to create an AI-powered prompt injection firewall capable of detecting malicious prompts, blocking unauthorized attempts to manipulate LLMs, and storing verifiable threat information using blockchain-powered threat intelligence management. The framework will combine machine-learning-based detection, rule-based security checks, and context-aware verification to enhance the protection of applications using large language models.The objectives of the proposed contribution are as follows:

i. Prompt injection attacks will be detected using DistilBERT-based analysis and rule-based verification.
ii. A context-aware harmful-content detection mechanism will be implemented to differentiate between malicious prompts and benign prompts with similar wording or phrasing.
iii. The framework will be capable of automatically blocking any prompt, which was identified as malicious, before it reaches the protected LLM application.
iv. The system will also allow safe prompts to pass through its detection mechanisms unaltered to minimize disruptions to LLM-based applications.
v. A unique cryptographic hash of a detected threat will be generated using the SHA-256 hashing algorithm.
vi. The framework will also feature a Threat Registry API to store and retrieve information about detected threats.
vii. Blockchain-based threat verification will be implemented to ensure that each threat signature registered using the Threat Registry API is verifiable and tamper-proof.

viii. The system will offer a comprehensive security framework by unifying prompt detection and blocking, threat signature generation, threat storage, and blockchain-based verification.
ix. The contribution will be evaluated by deploying and testing the updated system to observe and record the practical performance of the enhanced security framework.

1.6 Contribution for SentinelChain

The key contributions of the SentinelChain are described below:

- AI-Based Prompt Detection: Leverages the DistilBERT model with rule-based analysis for potential prompt injection detection.
- Context-Sensitive Prompt Injections: Detects context-sensitive prompt injections by understanding the context of potentially dangerous content.
- Automated Security Enforcement: Blocks the confirmed malicious prompts and allows the confirmed safe prompts automatically.
- Threat Signature Generation: Uses the SHA-256 cryptographic hashing to generate a unique signature for detected threats.
- Threat Registry and Blockchain Interoperability: Allows the storage and retrieval of any threat-related information using an API. Furthermore, blockchain serves to store the detected threat signatures for verification purposes.
- Integrated Security Ecosystem: Combines prompt analysis, security enforcement, threat identification, registry, and verification components into a single security ecosystem.
- Implementation and Validation: The updated solution has been implemented and validated in a production environment to confirm the described workflow.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

The rapid development of large language model (LLM)-based applications has led to an increased interest in the scientific community to secure such systems from prompt injection and related attacks. Various approaches, including rule-based detection, machine learning-based classification, instruction detection, multi-stage defending systems, and context-aware analysis, have been explored. At the same time, blockchain-based technologies have been considered to store and share threat intelligence in a reliable and trustless manner. This chapter summarizes the existing research and defines the research gap that the proposed solution, namely SentinelChain, addresses.

2.1 Existing Prompt Injection Detection Techniques

Prompt injection detection is an important research area for the security of LLM-integrated applications. Earlier research considered how malicious prompts could be detected before influencing the behavior of a language model. Various approaches were proposed that analyze the input prompt to look for suspicious instructions, attack patterns, semantics, or other features that deviate from the intended task. [1,2,3] .Earlier approaches commonly used rule-based or pattern-based detection. By using patterns, such methods simply define a set of signs that are characteristic of prompt injection attacks. This may concern attempts to ignore previous instructions, override system instructions, bypass restrictions, or extract confidential information. The strength of rule-based detection is its simplicity of implementation and speed, which makes it possible to detect attacks quickly.While its effectiveness is limited by the quality of the rules. Attackers may alter the phrasing, include various additional details, or use other methods to circumvent pattern-based checks. [2,3] .To overcome some of the shortcomings of pattern-based detection, machine-learning-based approaches were also considered. By using ML, it becomes possible to generalize over a set of malicious and benign prompts to find patterns characteristic of attacks. In this case, the flexibility of the model and the quality of the data it was trained on are much more important factors. Unlike rule-based detection, such an approach may recognize different phrasings of the same attack if they were represented in the training set. [3,4] .Later research directions have also included instruction detection and multi-stage prompt defenses. With these approaches, the focus is on detecting instruction injection rather than simply classifying the prompt as malicious. Moreover, complex multi-stage defenses allow for performing several safety checks before passing the prompt to the language model. These methods are useful when dealing with applications that process external information and thus face the threat of indirect prompt injection. [5,6] .One of the research directions that is also relevant to prompt injection is context-aware detection. In general, a security system must be able to differentiate between a genuine attempt to perform a malicious action and a benign use case. For example, a cybersecurity student may be studying prompt injection and request an example of an attack for defensive analysis. Thus, checking for context awareness is an essential part of analyzing the prompt. [6] .Considering the research directions

described above, it becomes apparent that a single method is unlikely to be sufficient for effective prompt injection detection. Therefore, the implemented system uses a combination of approaches. More specifically, there are three stages: DistilBERT-based analysis, rule-based detection, and context-aware harmful-content detection. Verified malicious attempts are blocked, while harmless prompts are processed.

Table2. Comparison of existing prompt injection detection approaches

Detection Approach	Basic Principle	Major Consideration
Rule-Based Detection	Searches for predefined attack patterns or keywords	May miss modified or previously unseen attacks
ML-Based Detection	Learns patterns from labelled prompt data	Depends on training data and model quality
Instruction Detection	Identifies instructions that may manipulate the LLM	Useful for analyzing untrusted content
Multi-Stage Defense	Combines multiple security checks	Provides layered analysis but may increase complexity
Context-Aware Detection	Considers the meaning and context of the prompt	Helps distinguish malicious and legitimate usage
Sentinel Chain	Combines DistilBERT, rules, and context-aware detection	Integrates detection with automated enforcement and threat intelligence

2.2 Rule-Based Detection Techniques

Rule-based detection is one of the approaches commonly used for the identification of prompt injection attacks in applications that include large language models (LLMs). In the context of rule-based detection of prompt injection attacks, security rules that define sets of words, phrases, patterns, or instructions associated with adversarial behaviors are established. By comparing the content of an incoming prompt with the predefined rules, the security mechanism identifies if the prompt should be subjected to further scrutiny or rejected according to the set rules. [1,2,3]. The rule-based patterns can include instruction variations that prompt the model to ignore previous instructions or override system or developer instructions, circumvent system restrictions or safety mechanisms, and identify otherwise inaccessible system information. The identified patterns can be grouped based on the nature of the attack to provide an understanding of the type of adversarial activity. Rule-based analysis is particularly beneficial as an initial security layer due to the transparency of the rules and the ability to review the rationale behind the decision. [2,3] . The strengths of rule-based detection include the relative ease of processing and interpretability of the information. Unlike processing conducted by complex machine-learning algorithms, the analysis based on predefined rules can be understood by a security analyst directly. Furthermore, the rules can be updated when new patterns are identified, making the rule-based analysis a valuable tool in the detection of known prompt injection techniques. [3] . However, the approach has significant limitations stemming from the characteristics of adversarial prompts. Attackers can alter the phrasing of instructions, use alternative terms, add additional information, or apply other modification techniques to evade detection. Furthermore, the system may produce false positives if a phrase associated with an adversarial prompt appears in a legitimate prompt. This may occur, for example, when a cybersecurity researcher intentionally attempts to trigger a prompt injection security mechanism for testing purposes. As a result, the application may have difficulties differentiating between legitimate and adversarial prompts. [4,5] . SentinelChain utilizes rule-based detection as one of the multiple detection mechanisms to address the limitations of standalone rule-based analysis. Specifically, the application employs a combination of rule-based analysis, DistilBERT-based processing, and context- and intent-aware harmful-content detection to identify adversarial prompts. Using this technique, incoming prompts are subject to multi-stage analysis before the determination of whether the prompt will be allowed or rejected by the system. In the context of prompt injection attack detection, rule-based analysis is used to identify patterns that have previously been associated with adversarial prompts, while the machine learning algorithm provides semantic analysis and context- and intent-aware detection. As a result, when the system identifies adversarial content in the prompt, it will reject the request and initiate the threat-signature generation process and the threat-registry processing. At the same time, legitimate prompts will be directed to the next stage of processing. The role of rule-based component of SentinelChain acts as a transparent first-level security layer, detecting known prompt-injection patterns. The overall security decision combines this information with the

results of the DistilBERT analysis and applies context-aware filters: Incoming Prompt → Rule Analysis + DistilBERT Analysis + Context Analysis → Security Decision → Allow / Block

2.3 Machine-Learning Based Detection

Machine-learning based detection techniques have also been studied as an alternative to the rule-based approach. In addition to the existing set of rules for detecting prompt injections attacks, machine-learning models could learn features that differentiate malicious and legitimate prompts from the training data. Such learning would allow the detection technique to detect variations of attacks that do not use exact words or patterns that were used when creating rules. [1,2,3] . Machine-learning algorithms can be used for classification of prompts according to the features derived from the text, whereas transformer-based models could detect more contextual and semantic relations in the input text. Transformer-based models, like BERT and its lighter versions, are especially helpful when analyzing natural language input since they detect relations between words and context of the input text. [3,4] . One of the biggest advantages of machine-learning based detection of prompt injection attacks is that they can generalize and detect variations of prompts. For instance, attackers can use different combinations of words and phrases to perform the same instruction overriding. A trained model can theoretically detect the similarities between such variations. However, the effectiveness of machine learning is highly dependent on the quality and diversity of dataset. [2,3]. There is also the difficulty of detecting malicious content from harmless discussions of the security-related subjects. A prompt that includes words like jailbreak, system prompt, or attack is not necessarily an attack prompt. As a result, the machine learning detection process has to take into account the context of the entire message and not rely on certain keywords alone. This is another reason why machine learning detection has to be supplemented with additional security measures. In SentinelChain, the machine learning element for prompt analysis is DistilBERT. The machine learning algorithm is combined with rule-based detection and context-aware harmful content analysis in order to achieve better security decision-making process. The input prompt is analyzed prior to being presented to the protected application. The prompts that are detected to be malicious will be automatically blocked, whereas safe prompts will pass. Machine learning and rule-based detection complement each other, with machine learning assisting with semantic and context-based analysis, and rules helping in detecting known attack patterns. This is the essential part of the SentinelChain prompt injection firewall.

Functions of the machine learning system are as follows:

Prompt received →DistilBERT Analysis → Prompt Contextual Evaluation → Joint Security Decision → Accept / Reject

In this way, SentinelChain is able to go beyond basic keyword searching and evaluate semantic aspects of the prompt without losing explicit security rules.

Table 3. ML purpose

Approach	Main Principle
Traditional ML Classification	Classifies prompts using extracted textual features
Transformer-Based Detection	Uses contextual language representations
Context-Aware Classification	Considers meaning and surrounding context
SentinelChain	DistilBERT + rules + context-aware analysis

2.4 Prompt Injection Defense Mechanism

The defensive mechanisms against prompt injection are focused on preventing malicious instructions from affecting the proper functioning of the LLM-based application. As attacks could be described in different ways and come from both the user input and the external source, one solution might not be applicable in all cases. Therefore, several solutions were explored, including input filtering, instruction analysis, machine-learning based approaches, prompt separation, and multi-level security pipeline. [1,2,3]. Input filtering could be considered as one of the possible methods of prompt injections mitigation when the input prompt is checked before the execution by an LLM. Malicious patterns or suspicious instructions could be recognized and the input prompt rejected. This method is fairly easy to implement, providing immediate protection against some of the attack patterns. Nevertheless, attackers are able to change the wording of their instructions using synonyms or some of the obfuscating techniques. [2,3]. Machine learning-based approach could be used when the trained model recognizes some of the properties of the input prompt as indicative of an attack or legitimate instructions. The advantage of such a model is a context-based analysis provided by the transformer-

based model, which is able to recognize the attack pattern even if it is described differently from the known pattern. Its effectiveness depends on the quality of the training dataset and the ability of the model to detect new patterns. [3,4]. Instruction detection and content separation are additional defensive methods that could be applied for applications working with external content. The idea of this method is that application distinguishes instructions that can be trusted as application's and not the untrusted content, so that the instructions provided in the document or webpage or even in the retrieved information are not treated as commands by the LLM. This approach could be useful against indirect prompt injection attacks. [4,5]. A multi-level defense mechanism includes multiple security checks rather than one. A prompt is checked via rule-based filtering, after which machine learning analysis and other contextual checks follow. The layered approach may ensure complementary security since the weaknesses of one detection mechanism will be covered by the others. [1,3].
The defense against prompt injections in SentinelChain is also designed to be a multi-level mechanism. Prompts are filtered via DistilBERT-based detection, rule-based analysis, and context-aware harmful content detection. The next step is making a security decision depending on the analysis results. Verified malicious prompts are blocked automatically, while verified safe prompts pass the check successfully.
Aside from prompt blocking, SentinelChain generates SHA-256 threat signatures for each threat and uses Threat Registry API and the blockchain-based verification mechanism to store the threat data. Thus, the defense mechanism in SentinelChain is not limited to blocking the prompts but includes threat data verification too.

Table 4. Defense mechanism purpose

Defense Mechanism	Main Function
Rule-Based Filtering	Detects predefined attack patterns
ML-Based Detection	Learns patterns from prompt data
Instruction Detection	Identifies instruction-like content
Content Separation	Separates trusted instructions from untrusted content
Multi-Stage Defense	Combines multiple security mechanisms
SentinelChain	DistilBERT + rules + context-aware detection + threat registry

2.5 Indirect Prompt Injection Detection

The threat of indirect prompt injection lies in the fact that an attacker does not need to inject their malicious instructions directly into the application. Instead, an attack involves embedding the attacker's commands into some external material, such as web pages, documents, emails, retrieved knowledge, and other sources. Once these materials are retrieved and provided to the LLM application, the embedded commands may be taken as inputs and impact the behavior of the model. [1,2,3]. While the attacker sends malicious commands directly in the case of direct prompt injection, such an injection is possible without any intentional actions of the victim user in the case of indirect injection. For instance, an attacker can embed their command in a webpage that will then be used by an LLM-based assistant as a source of information for retrieving knowledge. If the application is not able to differentiate between the trusted application instructions and untrusted external data, the model can follow the embedded command. Thus, indirect injection is especially important for applications utilizing RAG, web browsing, document processing, and other external components. [3,4] .There are several methods proposed to combat this issue. One way to protect against this problem is to employ instruction detection that would allow identifying instruction-like materials in retrieved or external data. Another possibility is separating the application instructions from untrusted data so that the retrieved information would be seen as data but not as a command by the model. Multi-stage security pipelines may be applied to inspecting external data as well. [4,5] . However, a problem for prompt injection attacks detection is the possibility to craft malicious instructions that look like regular content. Also, external data may include imperative sentences or security instructions. Hence, finding words like "ignore," "instruction," or "system" will not lead to correct results since the context must be considered as well. [3,4,21,25,24] .
SentinelChain introduces a context-aware component along with the DistilBERT-based detection and rule-based analysis. Context-aware component allows differentiating harmful content from safe one which may contain security terms. The resulting security decision is used to make an input acceptable or unacceptable.

Verified malicious prompts are blocked automatically, whereas safe prompts are permitted. The problem of indirect prompt injection shows the necessity of analyzing input before it is provided to the LLM. By making SentinelChain the security layer, it is possible to analyze prompts and block them in case they are malicious.

Table 5. Direct and indirect Prompt Injection

Feature	Direct Prompt Injection	Indirect Prompt Injection
Attack Source	Directly supplied by the attacker/user	Embedded in external or retrieved content
Typical Sources	User input, chat interface	Webpages, documents, emails, retrieved data
Attacker Interaction	Usually requires direct submission	May occur without direct interaction with the target application
Main Risk	Manipulation of model instructions	External content influencing model behavior
Detection Challenge	Wording and obfuscation variations	Distinguishing instructions from legitimate external content
Relevant Defense	Rule-based + ML + context analysis	Content inspection + instruction detection + contextual analysis

2.6 Blockchain-Based Cyber Threat Intelligence

Cyber threat intelligence (CTI) refers to the collection, analysis, storage, and distribution of information about cyber threats in order to help organizations detect and mitigate the effects of cyberattacks more effectively. In traditional threat-intelligence frameworks, there may be a centralized database or platform where threat information is kept by a single organization or service provider. While such systems may offer an efficient management solution, they may create problems associated with issues of data integrity, trust, single point of failures, and verification of the information submitted. [1,5] . The use of blockchain technology allows keeping the record of transactions distributed among participating parties. Since the records in the blockchain are interconnected and encrypted, previous information is made unchangeable and tamper-proof. Thus, blockchain becomes a good solution for any application requiring keeping the record of information shared among several organizations in a secure way. [5,6]

Using a CTI system based on blockchain technology allows sharing threat information in a decentralized way, which enables participating organizations to submit their information to a single registry. The rules of registration of the contributors and submission of threat information as well as verification of submitted records may be set in smart contracts. It eliminates the necessity of having a single trusted administrator for every threat-sharing process. [5] .One other vital property is traceability. By submitting a risk report to the blockchain community, a threat signature, threat category, contributor, and timestamp may be related to a blockchain transaction, thus offering a verifiable historical past of threat submissions that may allow the contributing and analyzing organizations to find out the place and when a threat was famous. [5,6] . Nevertheless, the blockchain will not itself decide if the submitted threat data is correct. A malicious or incorrect document could also be submitted by an authorized participant. Thus, blockchain-based threat intelligence platforms must be augmented with acceptable authentication, entry management, threat-analysis mechanisms, and verification procedures. This distinction is essential, as the blockchain will provide such properties as file integrity, traceability, and decentralization of verification, as opposed to offering built-in integrity of the underlying safety information. .In SentinelChain, the blockchain layer allows for collaborative threat intelligence by constructing on the prompt injection firewall. When a malicious prompt is detected, a SHA-256 cryptographic signature will probably be generated representing this threat. The threat information might then be saved via the Threat Registry API and related to blockchain-based mostly verification. The blockchain element is also a part of the collaborative threat intelligence by contemplating the prompt as a threat and detecting it as such. Instead of a safety occasion being an isolated function, the cryptographic signature of the identified prompt can be used as a menace identifier that can be verified and referenced by the collaborating entities. This connects prompt-level detection to a shared threat registry. The integration works so that the left side represents the AI-based prompt injection detection mechanism, while the right side shows how the detected threats can be registered and protected using the blockchain technology. In other words, the detection component helps identify any security issues, while the blockchain component provides

an additional layer of protection by storing relevant threat-related information as a record in the blockchain. Therefore, it can be stated that the blockchain is not utilized as a threat detection mechanism to prevent prompt injections. Instead, it is used to ensure that the detected threats can be recorded and protected in a better way than conventional methods.

2.7 Research Gaps in Existing Studies

The review of the related work demonstrates that prompt injection detection and defense mechanisms have evolved through various directions, including rule-based filtering, transformer-based detection, multi-agent defense pipelines, instruction detection, context evaluation, and task-alignment mechanisms. In particular, the Main Paper proposes a detection framework that combines predefined banned terms, similarity-based detection, and BERT-based classification to enable real-time prompt injection detection. Nevertheless, the paper also highlights the problem of evolving attack methods and the need to balance the detection and utility of the model. [1] .The latest research outputs demonstrate that the use of one detection or defense mechanism may not be sufficient to address the evolving prompt injection attacks. In particular, the evaluation of prompt injection defense mechanisms [2] demonstrated that the use of defense mechanisms that rely on the attacked model to protect itself eventually failed due to adaptive prompt injection attacks. Consequently, the paper emphasizes the importance of implementing security boundaries beyond the model. Similarly, [6] also emphasizes the need for evaluating prompt injection defense mechanisms against both existing and adaptive attacks and understanding their impact on the general-purpose utility of the LLM. Overall, the latest research results highlight the need for building security mechanisms that can be implemented as an application-level protection layer rather than relying on the underlying LLM to address prompt injection attacks. [2,6] .Another significant gap in prompt injection detection is its contextual ambiguity. Security-related lexemes such as jailbreak, system prompt, attack, or override can appear in a genuine educational, research, or cybersecurity context, and should not be blocked or redirected. In other words, prompt injection detection based on keywords or pattern matching can produce false positives that impede regular application usage. Recent works on context-aware prompt injection testing and robustness demonstrate that the application's intended use of an injected prompt should be taken into account for security assessment. [6,16] .Indirect prompt injection represents another significant gap because malicious instructions can come not from a user, but from external content. In particular, web pages, documents, retrieved information, emails, and other sources can contain hidden instructions that get processed by an LLM application. Several papers on indirect prompt injection utilize instruction detection, content separation, task alignment, and other methods for mitigation. However, these works also highlight the need to secure an LLM application with prompt security controls at the application layer, as opposed to relying on the language model only. [15,17,18] .The literature on cyber threat intelligence reveals another gap centered around the storage and sharing of intelligence data. Traditional CTI systems often rely on centralized infrastructures, whereas blockchain-based approaches offer better traceability, decentralization, contributor management, and integrity auditing. Several works on blockchain-based CTI explore reputation systems and incentives for encouraging contributors to share threat intelligence in good faith. However, blockchain-based CTI research rarely integrates prompt injection detection with an LLM security firewall. [4,7,9,11,12,13,25,23,21] .The reviewed research indicates that there is an opportunity to combine LLM prompt injection detection and cybersecurity threat intelligence. Whereas existing works explore detection, defense, indirect injection, or blockchain-based CTI sharing as standalone subjects, an integrated approach would combine AI-based prompt analysis, explicit security rules, contextual detection, automatic blocking, cryptographic threat identification, registry management, and blockchain verification. This section summarizes the major research gaps in prompt injection detection and threat intelligence that contribute to the motivation and research questions of SentinelChain.

Table 6. Research gaps identified from existing literature

Research Area	Existing Limitation	Requirement Identified
Rule-based detection	Can be bypassed through modified or obfuscated wording	Complementary semantic detection
ML-based detection	Depends on training data and unseen attack handling	Context-aware and adaptive analysis
Indirect prompt injection	Malicious instructions can originate from external content	Protection against untrusted content
Context ambiguity	Legitimate security discussions may	Context-aware classification

	be incorrectly flagged	
Defense mechanisms	Individual defenses address specific attack scenarios	Layered security approach
Threat intelligence	Detection and CTI management are often separate	Integrated threat management
Centralized CTI	Trust and integrity concerns	Verifiable distributed registry
Blockchain CTI	Mostly applied to general cybersecurity threats	Application to prompt injection intelligence
Threat verification	Shared threat information requires trustworthy records	Cryptographic and blockchain verification

The shortcomings discovered in the course of the conducted research prompt the development of the SentinelChain, an AI prompt injection firewall that utilizes the blockchain technology to share threat intelligence in the form of prompt signatures. The suggested tool is designed to implement the DistilBERT prompt analysis, rule-based prompt detection, context-aware harmful-content identification, blocking of malicious prompts, white-listing of safe prompts, generation of SHA-256 prompt threat signatures, Threat Registry API utilization, and blockchain-based prompt threat signature verification through the integrated application-level firewall.

3. PROBLEM DEFINITION

3.1 Problem Statement

The swift rise of usage of Large Language Models in intelligent assistants, information retrieval systems, decision support systems, and tool empowered AI systems creates new security challenges. As such systems rely on instruction in natural language provided by the users or consumed from external sources, the prompt can be leveraged to compromise the integrity of the underlying language model. Prompt injection attacks attempt to bypass the built-in safety mechanisms of an LLM application, exfiltrate data, disclose secrets, or inject instructions that lead the target application to perform some action detrimental to its security posture. With both direct and indirect prompt injection techniques, the application under attack can have compromised instructions injected either directly by the user or indirectly from external information sources. [1,5] .The prior work highlights several approaches for prompt injection detection and prevention through rule-based filtering, machine learning based detection, instruction detection, multi-tiered defense pipelines, and task alignment. However, the approaches are limited in the presence of modified attacks, contexts, indirect injections, and adaptive behaviors. Also, a prompt with security-related words may not necessarily be malicious, and benign security prompts need to be differentiated from potential attack vectors. [2,6,15,16] .Another issue is the response to the detected threat. Most approaches are focused on either detection or prevention. The threat intelligence management and collaborative verification of potential security issues are separate research areas. While blockchain-based threat intelligence research highlights the potential of distributed and verifiable storage of threat information for collaborative defense, it is not directly applicable to prompt injection firewall with prompt-level analysis. [9,11,13] .Thus, the research problem addressed by the current work is the design and development of an enterprise-grade prompt injection detection, prevention, and response system that can analyze incoming prompts, identify malicious or harmful input, assess the context, automatically prevent the attack, generate a unique threat signature, maintain threat registry for future reference, and facilitate collaborative threat intelligence sharing through blockchain-based verifiable threat storage. The project of developing the SentinelChain prompt injection firewall is a way to address the problem by implementing a combination of AI-based prompt analysis, rule-based security scoring, context-aware detection mechanisms, threat registry, cryptographic signing of threat intelligence, and blockchain-assisted threat intelligence sharing and verification.

3.2 Limitations of Existing Systems

The existing prompt injection defense systems have the following shortcomings:

- Rule-based approaches: Can be bypassed through the use of modified wording or obfuscation.
- ML-based approaches: Are reliant on the quality and breadth of training data.
- Indirect attacks: Instructing the model through malicious instructions in externally provided content can be challenging.

- Context ambiguity: Security-related words may appear in legitimate prompts, potentially triggering false positives.
- Threat management: Many detection systems lack integrated threat storage, verification, and intelligence-sharing capabilities.
- Centralized systems: May offer limited decentralized verification and traceability.

Therefore, the need arises for an integrated system encompassing detection, contextual analysis, automated blocking, threat management, and verifiable sharing.

3.3 Research Objectives

The main goals of SentinelChain are as follows:

a. Use AI-analytical and rule-based methods to identify prompt injection attacks.
b. Achieve context-aware detection of harmful prompts.
c. Automatically allow benign prompts while blocking malicious ones.
d. Produce SHA-256 threat signatures for detected threats.
e. Store and retrieve detected threats using a Threat Registry API.
f. Offer blockchain-based verification and auditability of threats.
g. Build an integrated solution that unifies the above capabilities in one LLM security system.

3.4 Scope of the proposed System

The scope of SentinelChain includes the discovery and prevention of malicious prompts in the functioning of applications that include LLMs. The system checks prompts using AI-based, rule-based, and context-aware algorithms. Then, it allows safe prompts or prevents malicious ones.The system also creates SHA-256 threat signatures and stores threat information using the Threat Registry and blockchain technology to verify and trace threats. The proposed system covers prompt analysis, threat detection, automated blocking, threat signature generation, threat registry management, and blockchain-based threat verification.

4. PROPOSED SYSTEM

4.1 Overview of SentinelChain

SentinelChain is presented as an AI-based prompt injection firewall aiming to protect Large Language Model (LLM) applications from malicious prompt injections. The firewall scans incoming prompts before passing them to the protected LLM application.

The proposed framework utilizes DistilBERT-based analysis, rule-based checks, and contextual harmful-content detection mechanisms to identify prompt injections and malicious inputs. According to the firewall, detected malicious inputs are blocked, while legitimate prompts are passed to the protected LLM application. Next, for blocked prompt injections, the SHA-256 hash of the threat is stored as a unique threat signature along with the information about the threat in the Threat Registry. Further, the blockchain is employed to verify SentinelChain's threat registry records, enabling enhanced threat intelligence sharing through zero-trust network security based on timestamped, cryptographically signed blocks. Overall, the prompt injection firewall protects LLM applications by scanning incoming prompts, detecting prompt injections and malicious inputs, blocking them, and storing their threat signatures in the threat registry with the utilization of blockchain technology.




Fig3. Overall Architecture of SentinelChain

4.2 Overall Architecture

The general architecture of SentinelChain consists of components that together enable prompt injection detection, blocking, and management. The process starts from user prompt, which is submitted through the web-based frontend interface. The prompt is analyzed by the Prompt Analysis layer, which performs task such as preprocessing, rule-based checks, DistilBERT-based detection, and context-aware harmful-content detection. The results together used to decide whether the prompt is safe or malicious. If the prompt is safe, it is allowed to pass to the protected LLM application. In the case of a malicious prompt, it blocks and instead of sending to the LLM. The detected threat is passed to the Threat Handling and Registry layer, generating a SHA-256 signature algorithm and storing the threat information in the Threat Registry of the system. The stored threat can be recorded and verified through the blockchain layer, providing integrity and traceability. Verified threat information can then be used for threat intelligence sharing and security monitoring among participating organizations.

Main components of the architecture are:

- User / Client – Submits prompts to the system.
- Frontend Interface – Provides the web interface for prompt submission and displaying security results.
- Prompt Analysis – Performs preprocessing and analysis.
- Threat Detection – Uses rule-based detection, DistilBERT, and context-aware analysis.
- Security Decision – Determines whether the prompt should be allowed or blocked.
- Threat Signature Generation – Creates a unique SHA-256 signature for detected threats.
- Threat Registry – Stores threat information and metadata.
- Blockchain Verification – Records and verifies threat information.
- Threat Intelligence Sharing – Supports access to verified threat information.

4.3 System Workflow

The operation of the SentinelChain begins when a user submits a prompt through the web interface. First, it undergoes the firewall process, which uses rule-based detection, DistilBERT-based analysis, and context-aware harmful-content detection to label it as either benign or malignant. Depending on the results of the analysis,

the system allows either blocked or unblocked access to the protected LLM application. In case of a blocked prompt, SentinelChain creates a SHA-256 threat signature and stores relevant information about the threat in the Threat Registry. The blockchain layer is engaged to perform the verification and traceability functions. The information about the threat can be used for further threat intelligence and security operations.



Fig5. Workflow of the proposed SentinelChain prompt injection firewall

4.4 Prompt Analysis

Prompt Analysis is the first major security phase in SentinelChain. After a user provides a prompt, the prompt undergoes an analysis phase prior to being sent to the protected LLM application. The aim of the phase is to detect any pattern, semantic features, or context that can be indicative of either prompt injection or a malicious request. In SentinelChain, prompt analysis is achieved through three different approaches: rule-based detection, DistilBERT-based analysis, and context-aware harmful content detection. The rule-based approach detects any suspicious instruction patterns, while DistilBERT is used to analyze the semantic features of the prompt. The context-aware approach will help distinguish any malicious inputs from regular prompts which use security terms. The results obtained from this analysis will be transferred to the threat detection phase, where the system decides whether this prompt is safe or harmful. This will decrease the dependency on keyword analysis and will provide a context-based analysis of prompts.

4.5 Threat Detection

In the process of threat detection, the incoming prompt is analyzed in order to detect any malicious content or threat posed by the request. SentinelChain uses the following methods for detecting the presence of prompt injection attacks and minimizing false positives: rule-based detection, DistilBERT-based analysis, and context-based detection. Rule-based detection detects attack patterns, whereas DistilBERT analysis provides semantic understanding of the incoming prompt. Context-based detection analyzes the meaning of the input in order to differentiate the genuine requests related to security and attacks. Depending on the results of the analysis, the prompt is classified as either safe or malicious. The malicious prompts are blocked by the system, and the safe

prompts pass to the next step of the pipeline, which is the protected LLM application. The output of this stage is further processed in the Risk-Based Decision stage.

4.6 Risk-Based Decision

Following the threat detection process, the SentinelChain system will make a security decision depending on the outcome of the analysis. It will decide if the incoming prompt is safe or needs to be blocked. The prompt that is considered safe is allowed to pass to the LLM application, while the prompt that is considered malicious is automatically blocked by the system to ensure that the attack does not reach the LLM. The decision-making process is the enforcement level of the firewall that ensures that all detected malicious prompts are blocked, while other prompts continue their normal functioning. In case of blocking the prompts, the system moves to the stage of threat signature generation, where the unique SHA-256 signature is generated for threat identification and further registration and blockchain process.

4.7 Threat Signature Generation

Once the prompt is deemed malicious and blocked, SentinelChain creates a threat signature of the block by applying a hashing algorithm, SHA-256. The threat signature is based on the blocked prompt and creates a unique fixed-size string that represents the threat and does not depend on the prompt for identifying it. The hash is linked to the threat information like type of threat and details of the detection. This threat signature is used throughout the process of storing threats into the threat registry and verifying threats using blockchain technology. Since SHA-256 is applied, it ensures the integrity of the threat identity since any change to the prompt results in the different hash value. In other words, threat signatures provide an efficient way to identify the threat for subsequent actions. Process:

Blocked Malicious Prompt→ SHA-256 Hash Generation→ Threat Signature → Threat Registry → Blockchain Verification

4.8 Blockchain Threat Registry

The Blockchain Threat Registry is employed to keep track of detected prompt injection threat signatures in a manner which will ensure integrity and verifiability of these records. After a malicious prompt is filtered out and its SHA-256 signature is obtained, threat data is added to the threat registry for the purpose of further verification and tracking. Blockchain uses a smart contract in order to store threat data and contributor data. Information on each threat which is registered may include threat signature, threat type, risk, timestamp, threat reporter and threat verification status. Threat verification by contributors is possible through use of the blockchain threat registry in order to ensure that threat signatures are recorded. This guarantees that the history of identified threats is kept in a way that is maintained and monitored.

Process:

Blocked Threat → SHA-256 Signature → Threat Registry → Smart Contract → Blockchain Entry → Verification

4.9 Threat Intelligence Sharing

In addition to prompt injection detection, SentinelChain offers a method for storing and distributing information about detected threat. The process involves recording the threat signature and security information about the detected malicious prompt in the Threat Registry. Previously detected threats can then be accessed for security monitoring purposes. The blockchain layer acts as an evidence of registered threats, which enables participants or contributors to validate threat information. It enables the exchange of information about the threat from prompt injection without the need for using the original prompt as the threat signature. This process enables SentinelChain to integrate threat detection with threat intelligence management such that the detected attacks can be used to build a common and verifiable security knowledge base.

5.1 Rule-Based Heuristic Detection

The method of rule-based heuristic detection is applied as the initial step for prompt security in SentinelChain. It recognizes certain patterns that are widely utilized in prompt injections, including an effort to override instructions, disregard previous instructions, circumvent safety limitations, or acquire confidential data. If there is a match between a prompt and one of the predefined security rules, it is recognized as suspicious or malicious. Nevertheless, rule-based detection cannot recognize all possible modified or new attacks. That is why SentinelChain employs this detection mechanism in combination with DistilBERT analysis and context-aware detection methods.

Basic Algorithm:

Step1: Get user prompt.

Step2: Preprocess and analyze the input.

Step3: Detect the match between a prompt and predefined security rules.

Step4: Detect matching malicious patterns.

Step5: Detect a suspicious pattern and flag a prompt.
Step6: Transfer the result to the combined threat decision step.
Input: User Prompt
Output: Result of Rule-Based Detection

4.10 DistilBERT-Based Prompt Classification

SentinelChain applies DistilBERT as the ML module responsible for analyzing the semantics of incoming prompts. DistilBERT is a small transformer-based language model that can find connections between words and their environment, making it useful in the analysis of security inputs in natural language. The prompt is fed into the DistilBERT model after the preprocessing stage. The model analyzes the linguistic and contextual features of the input and gives the classification result. Thus, the firewall can detect malicious prompts even if they use different wording compared to the predefined rule patterns. The DistilBERT classification result is taken into account together with the results of rule-based and context-aware analysis in order to make the final security decision. In this way, SentinelChain can use explicit attack patterns and semantic information in the detection of prompts.

Basic Algorithm:
Step1: Get the input prompt.
Step2: Preprocess the prompt.
Step3: Encode the prompt to model-friendly tokens.
Step4: Feed the tokens into the DistilBERT model.
Step5: Get the classification result of the model.
Step6: Feed the result into the combined threat decision stage.
Input: User Prompt
Output: DistilBERT Classification Result

4.11 Context-Aware Harmful-Content Detection

The SentienlChain also employs context-aware detection of harmful content to increase the differentiation of actual harmful prompts and harmless prompts containing terms associated with security. It is necessary since words such as jailbreak, system prompt, or attack can be used in cybersecurity-related research, learning, or tests, which will not necessarily mean the presence of the attack.The context-aware module takes into account the semantics and context of the entire prompt rather than focusing solely on keywords. The output of this module is taken into consideration along with the results of the rule-based detection and DistilBERT analysis for making the ultimate threat decision.

It allows reducing the amount of false positive cases while maintaining the capability of detecting malicious prompts.

Basic Algorithm:
Step1:Get the input prompt.
Step2: Analyze the context and semantics of the whole prompt.
Step3: Detect potentially harmful intent or content.
Step4: Differentiate malicious usage from legitimate one.
Step5: Obtain the context analysis result.
Step6: Pass it to the combined threat detection process.
Input: User Prompt
Output: Context-Aware Detection Result

4.12 Combined Threat Decision

The SentinelChain makes the final decision about security based on outputs from the rule-based detector, DistilBERT model, and the context-aware harmful-content detector. This enables the system to take into account both known attack vectors and semantic and contextual features of the prompt.

In the process of making the decision, the incoming prompt is classified as either safe or malicious. Safe prompts are passed to the protected LLM application, while malicious prompts are automatically blocked.

Basic algorithm:
Step1: Receive the detection results from all the analysis components.
Step2: Compare and evaluate the detection results.
Step3: Classify the prompt as either safe or malicious.
Step4: In case the prompt is safe, pass it through.
Step5: In case the prompt is malicious, block it.
Step6: For Block: Generate SHA-256 threat signature.
Input: Detection results

Output: Decision safe/malicious

4.13 SHA 256 Threat Signature Generation

For any prompt that has been detected as malicious, the SentinelChain generates the SHA-256 hash of the threat to create a threat signature. This unique identifier is used to store, find, and verify threat signatures on the blockchain. Prior to generating the hash, the prompt will be preprocessed to strip off any unnecessary spaces. Then the prompt is encoded with UTF-8 and SHA-256 algorithm.

Basic Algorithm:

Step1: Get blocked malicious prompt
Step2: Preprocess the prompt to get rid of any extra spaces
Step3: Convert the prompt into UTF-8 encoding
Step4: Compute SHA-256 hash of the prompt
Step5: Compute hexadecimal hash value
Step6: Save signature and threat information
Step7: Verify the threat signature in the registry and blockchain
Input: Blocked malicious prompt
Output: SHA-256 threat signature

4.14 Blockchain Threat Verification Algorithm

SentinelChain employs the use of a smart contract which makes use of the blockchain technology in order to document and authenticate detected threats. Once the threat is blocked and the signature is generated through the SHA-256 method, the threat information can then be added to the blockchain registry using an authorized contributor.

The smart contract authenticates the threat information and documents information such as threat signature, threat type, threat level, timestamp, reporter, and verification status. Authorized contributors can then proceed to verify the threat in the blockchain.

Basic Algorithm:

Step1: Accept threat signature through SHA-256 method.
Step2: Determine whether the contributor is authorized.
Step3: Verify threat information.
Step4: Send threat information to the smart contract.
Step5: Determine whether the threat exists in the blockchain.
Step6: Add threat to the blockchain.
Step7: Allow verification by authorized contributors.
Step8: Update verification status based on certain verification criteria.

Input: Threat signature and threat information
Output: Recorded and verified threat in the blockchain

5. SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION

6.1 System Requirement

SentinelChain is implemented as a web-based application with front end, back end, machine learning, database, and blockchain components. The main software and technologies used to implement SentinelChain are as follows.

Table7. Components required

Component	Technology Used
Frontend	React, Vite, Tailwind CSS
Backend	FastAPI, Python
AI Model	DistilBERT
Database	SQLite
Blockchain	Solidity, Hardhat
Blockchain Interaction	Web3 / Ethers.js

API Communication	REST API
Wallet Integration	MetaMask

The implementation needs a modern browser and an environment that can run the front end, back end, and the local blockchain.

5.2 Frontend Implementation

SentinelChain frontend is responsible for providing the web-based user interface via which both users and system administrators are able to communicate with the security system. The frontend was developed using React and Vite, with Tailwind CSS utilized for the user interface and styling. The frontend has modules for prompt submission, detection results display, detection tracking, threat registry access, and blockchain information display. It communicates with the backend using REST APIs and shows the security status of submitted prompts.Additionally, it has an option of connecting to the blockchain and communicating with blockchain-based functions responsible for threat verification via Ethers.js and MetaMask.

Frontend Key Functions:

i. Prompt submission and firewall analysis
ii. Safe or blocked result display
iii. Threat feed and threat registry
iv. Blockchain registry information
v. Organization/contributor management
vi. Security analytics and dashboard
vii. Wallet connection using MetaMask




Fig6. SentinelChain Frontend Dashboard

5.3 Backend Implementation

The backend of SentinelChain is designed to process the prompts, analyze their security, handle threat information, and interact with the database and blockchain layers. It is based on Python and FastAPI and features REST API endpoints for interacting with the frontend. After receiving a prompt, the backend passes it through the detection components which include rule-based analysis, DistilBERT-based analysis, and context-based detection depending on the configuration. Afterward, depending on the outcome of the security decision, the backend either allows or blocks the prompt respectively. When blocking a threat, the backend computes its SHA-256 signature and maintains its threat record. It also interacts with the Threat Registry and blockchain components when storing and validating the threat information. The backend also implements API services related to threat retrieval, validation, statistics, contributor information, and audit.




Fig7. SentinelChain Backend

5.4 Database Implementation

The database used by SentinelChain to store and manage application data is SQLite. The database keeps data about the detected threats, contributors, and audit logs.

Threats table contains data about the detected threats such as threat signature, prompt information, threat type, detection details, time stamp, blockchain status, and verification information. Contributors table contains data about organizations or contributors. Audit logs table contains security and administrative events.

The database works with the Threat Registry API and blockchain. Local database storage helps in efficient retrieval of threat data, while the blockchain helps in verifying the data.

Table8. Main database

Table	Purpose
Threats	Stores detected threat information
Contributors	Stores authorized contributor details
Audit Logs	Records security and administrative events

5.5 ML Model Implementation

SentinelChain implements DistilBERT as the machine learning part for prompt analysis. The model takes the textual content of the prompt, analyzes its semantics and context to detect prompt injection. The model operates together with the rule-based detection and context-based harmful content detection modules. As a result, the system can take into account the pre-defined patterns of the attacks as well as the context of the prompt prior to making a security decision.During the processing of the submitted prompt by the model, the classification result is forwarded to the joint threat decision-making module. The final decision will be made about the safety and acceptance of the prompt.

5.6 Smart Contract Implementation

SentinelChain leverages a Solidity-based smart contract in order to manage the blockchain threat registry. Smart contracts are deployed and executed using the blockchain environment in order to enable registered contributors to be able to register and authenticate the discovered threat. The smart contract stores information such as the threat signature, threat type, risk level, timestamp, reporter, number of verifications and verification status. In addition, the smart contract handles contributor registration and authentication.

The main functions of the smart contract are:

- Contributor Registration – Registers authorized participants.
- Threat Reporting – Stores a reported threat within the blockchain.
- Threat Verification – Verifies threats that have been stored on the blockchain.
- Contributor Deauthentication – Stops deauthenticated contributors from reporting new threats.
- Threat Retrieval – Access to information about reported threats.

This means that the smart contract serves as the blockchain layer for SentinelChain.

Table9. Major Smart Contract Function

Function	Purpose
registerContributor()	Registers a new contributor
deauthorizeContributor()	Deauthorizes a contributor
reportThreat()	Registers a detected threat
verifyThreat()	Verifies a registered threat
isThreatRegistered()	Checks threat registration
getThreatHashes()	Retrieves registered threat hashes

5.7 API Communication

REST APIs have been used in SentinelChain to facilitate communication among the frontend, the backend, the threat registry, and other system modules. The frontend communicates users' requests to the FastAPI backend through which the prompt will be analyzed and the right security response will be produced. This layer carries out essential functions including prompt analysis, threat submission, threat extraction, threat validation, contributor handling, and system statistics.

Overall, the communication process takes the following form:

Frontend → REST API → Back-end Processing → Detection / Database / Blockchain → API Response → Frontend

This API-based architecture ensures that the user interface is separated from the security processing systems, hence facilitating the interaction among the various modules of SentinelChain.

Table10. Main API Operations

API Operation	**Purpose**
Firewall Analysis	Analyzes submitted prompts
Threat Management	Stores and retrieves detected threats
Threat Verification	Handles threat verification
Contributor Management	Manages authorized contributors
Statistics	Provides system statistics
Blockchain Operations	Communicates with blockchain services

5.8 Dashboard Interface

SentinelChain Dashboard serves as an integrated interface for the management and monitoring of the entire security system. This interface presents information regarding prompt analysis, identified threats, threat registry, blockchain, contributors, and security statistics. It enables users to submit prompts for analysis by the firewall and check whether they have been either allowed or denied. Users can access threats, live threats feed, blockchain data, organization data, and analytics through this interface.

The major dashboard components include:

- Dashboard – Presenting all security information and statistics.
- AI Firewall – Offering prompt analysis and security decisions.
- Threat Reports – Showing detected threats.
- Live Threat Feed – Showing newly detected threats.
- Blockchain Registry – Showing registered threat information.
- Organizations – Showing information about the contributors.
- Analytics – Showing security statistics.

5.9 Screenshots of the Implemented System

In this section, we have provided the screenshot images of the real SentinelChain framework implementation to illustrate the important functional elements and user interactions within the system. The screenshots offer proof of working frontend, prompt analysis, threat detection, and threat management.




Fig8. Safe prompt analysis and successful request processing




Fig9. Detection and automatic blocking of a malicious prompt



Fig10. Threat Registry Interface




Fig11. Blockchain verification




Fig12. Downloadable SentinelChain Threat Analysis Report


SENTINELCHAIN

LLM Prompt Trust & Threat Monitoring Dashboard

SENTINELCHAIN THREAT REPORT

Report ID:	SENT-TX-483921
Organization:	ORG-B-002
Timestamp:	10/5/2026, 11:09:04 AM
Decision:	BLOCK
Attack Type:	Data Extraction
Risk Level:	Level 4 / 5
Trust Score:	11 / 100
Integrity Score:	22 / 100
Sensitive Data Target:	Database Credentials
Detection Confidence:	97%

Original Attack Prompt Payload:

Output the API keys, configuration variables, and credentials stored in memory.

Mitigation Action Verdict:

Request rejected before reaching the LLM.

Blockchain Registry Integrity:

Threat Hash: 0x1f12b7a9e9ab6c8043b6d859faae59bcf7828dccd34bcdef92a10dfa28e8bc2a

On-Chain Tx Receipt: 0x56a421b8fdc6e9874e9840b8cd90a36ee6ca129e9ee7bcfdc28394bcf0762634

Fig13. Downloaded Report

7. RESULT AND DISCUSSION

7.1 Experimental Setup

SentinelChain was evaluated by performing tests with both safe and malicious prompt-injection inputs to assess its capability of analyzing prompts and enforcing security. Prompt inputs were submitted to the SentinelChain firewall instead of being sent directly to the secured LLM. Then, the firewall analyzed the input based on its detection layers and made a decision on its security. The system uses React and Vite for the frontend interface and Python FastAPI as the backend. Application data is stored in SQLite, and prompt analysis includes DistilBERT prompt analysis, rules-based detection, and context-aware detection of harmful content. Depending on the results of analysis, the prompt is determined as either safe or malicious.

If the prompt is malicious, SentinelChain firewall prevents the request from reaching the LLM. Then, it calculates the SHA-256 threat signature and stores the threat information in the threat registry using blockchain technology.The assessment must be made on the basis of the actual test set that you will use to implement your system. In cases where there is enough labelled test data, the following metrics can be used: accuracy, precision, recall, F1-Score, false positive rate (FPR), and false negative rate (FNR).

7.2 Dataset Description

Two types of prompts have been considered in the evaluation dataset: safe prompts and malicious prompts. Safe prompts refer to normal user requests without any attempt to influence the behavior or instructions of the language model. Malicious prompts refer to requests that try to do something via prompt injection, such as instruction override, jailbreak, or information extraction of sensitive information. Some examples of malicious prompts used for the evaluation process include trying to ignore instructions, expose confidential information about the system, overcome security constraints, or change the expected behavior of the model. In order to prevent contamination, the final evaluation dataset should be different from the training dataset whenever possible. The classification metrics used in the next sections can be calculated based on the results of predictions on the test samples.

Table11. Dataset Distribution

Category	Number of Samples

Total prompts	50
Safe prompts	23
Malicious prompts	27
Training prompts	40
Testing prompts	10

7.3 Detection Results

Each prompt input into SentinelChain is classified as being either a safe or malicious prompt. Safe prompts are allowed to pass through the intended workflow, whereas malicious prompts are blocked from entering the LLM via the firewall.

Results for classification can be shown in a confusion matrix with four possible classifications:

Table12. Observed prompt detection results

Prompt type	Attack type	Decision	Risk level
Safe	Safe	Allow	0/5
Malicious	Instruction override	Block	5/5
Malicious	Jailbreak	Block	5/5
Malicious	Data extraction	Block	4/5

A true positive (TP) is where the classification correctly recognizes a malicious prompt as such, while a true negative (TN) is when the prompt is allowed through and correctly classified as being safe. A false positive (FP) is when the system misclassifies the safe prompt as being malicious, and a false negative (FN) is where the system misclassifies the malicious prompt as being safe.

The actual TP, TN, FP, and FN are used to determine the performance metrics in section 7.4.

7.4 Performance Metrics

The classification results are evaluated using accuracy, precision, recall, F1-score, false positive rate, and false negative rate.

Table13. Confusion matrix for the five demonstrated test case

Actual class	Predicted safe	Predicted malicious
Safe	TN = 1	FP = 0
Malicious	FN = 0	TP = 4

a. Accuracy

Accuracy represents the proportion of correctly classified prompts among all test prompts.

$$\text{Accuracy} = \frac{\text{TP} + \text{TN}}{\text{TP} + \text{TN} + \text{FP} + \text{FN}}$$

Accuracy = 100%

b. Precision

Precision represents the proportion of prompts classified as malicious that were actually malicious.

$$\text{Precision} = \frac{\text{TP}}{\text{TP} + \text{FP}}$$

Precision = 100%

c. Recall

Recall represents the proportion of malicious prompts that were correctly detected.

$$\text{Recall} = \frac{\text{TP}}{\text{TP} + \text{FN}}$$

Recall = 100%

d. F1-Score

F1-score combines precision and recall into a single measure.

$$\text{F1} = 2 \times \frac{\text{Precision} \times \text{Recall}}{\text{Precision} + \text{Recall}}$$

F1-score = 100%

e. False Positive Rate

FPR represents the proportion of safe prompts incorrectly classified as malicious.

$$\text{FPR} = \frac{\text{FP}}{\text{FP} + \text{TN}}$$

FPR = 0%

f. False Negative Rate

FNR represents the proportion of malicious prompts incorrectly classified as safe.

$$\text{FNR} = \frac{\text{FN}}{\text{FN} + \text{TP}}$$

FNR = 0%

Table14. Performance metrics

Metric	Obtained Value
Accuracy	100%
Precision	100%
Recall	100%
F1-score	100%
False Positive Rate	0%
False Negative Rate	0%

7.5 Confusion Matrix

Classification results are then represented using a confusion matrix. The confusion matrix describes the total number of instances where the safe or malicious prompts were correctly or wrongly classified. The correct identification of the malicious prompt is termed a true positive, while the correct identification of the safe prompt is referred to as a true negative. False positive cases involve the blocking of legitimate prompts, while false negatives entail the allowance of malicious prompts.The confusion matrix helps us clearly identify the type of errors generated through classification.

7.6 Analysis of Detection Components

SentinelChain employs several detection components as part of the prompt analysis. The rule-based component detects pre-defined patterns that relate to known instances of prompt injections. Semantic analysis of the prompt is performed by DistilBERT, while context-aware analysis facilitates the distinction between the potentially malicious input and legitimate prompts that contain security terminology.

Table 15. Detection components used in SentinelChain

Detection Component	Role in SentinelChain	Limitation
Rule-Based Detection	Identifies predefined suspicious patterns	May miss modified or previously unseen wording
DistilBERT	Performs semantic prompt classification	Requires model inference
Context-Aware Detection	Considers the context of potentially harmful content	Depends on contextual information
Combined Detection	Uses the implemented detection layers for the final	More processing is involved

	decision	

The rule-based component allows explicit detection of known patterns, while DistilBERT offers semantic analysis of the input. The context-aware analysis provides additional details to be able to distinguish malicious intent from legitimate security discussion.

7.7 Blockchain Threat Verification Results

Once a threat is detected, SentinelChain generates a SHA-256 threat signature and registers threat information for the detected threat in the threat registry. The blockchain system serves as an interface for registering and validating the generated threat signature. The interface developed in this research shows registered threat hashes along with the attack type, reporting organization, verification count, and status of blockchain registration. A SentinelChain threat report generated after the detection of a threat is composed of a threat hash and the transaction receipt on-chain. For instance, the attached SentinelChain threat report detects Instruction Override with a risk level of 5 out of 5 and a SHA-256 threat hash with a transaction receipt on-chain.

Table 16. Example blockchain threat verification record

Parameter	Observed Result
Threat Signature	SHA-256 hash generated
Attack Type	Instruction Override
Risk Level	Level 5 / 5
Blockchain Status	Verified
Verification Count	As displayed by system
Transaction Receipt	Available

The blockchain registry interface presented in Figure 11 demonstrates the registration and verification of threat signatures.

7.8 Discussion of Findings

The presented experiment provides an insight into the main way of operation of SentinelChain firewall. The system is expected to process the incoming prompts prior to the LLM to filter out any harmful inputs. The developed detection procedure involves using rule-based detection, DistilBERT classifier, and context-aware analysis. Such a procedure allows one to cover various aspects of prompt injection detection, as the rule-based detection allows identifying known patterns, the semantic analysis allows considering variations in wording, while the context-aware analysis helps in distinguishing legitimate security content from the malicious input. Functional testing also helps to identify the enforcement phase of the system. For example, the safe-prompt in the submission received an ALLOW response from the firewall, but the malicious prompt was identified as BLOCK response along with the instruction override type of attack. Additionally, the generated threat report captures the blocking action, threat signature, and details about blockchain transaction. In addition to prompt detection, the SentinelChain framework goes one step further by adding threat management to the pipeline. Threats that have been detected can also be assigned a cryptographic signature of SHA-256 and logged in the threat registry and blockchain. The performance of the firewall can be evaluated based on its accuracy, precision, recall, F1-score, FPR, and FNR values that have been determined during testing on the final dataset.

8 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

7.1 CONCLUSION

LLM-integrated systems offer valuable functionality; however, these systems are open to such threats as prompt injection, jailbreak, instructions tampering, and information extraction. Standard security solutions which rely solely on pre-defined rules may struggle to cope with wording variation in attacks and distinguish between malicious prompts and harmless security-related input. SentinelChain is a solution which can help to tackle these issues. It is an AI-powered prompt injection firewall using a combination of prompt analysis by

DistilBERT model, rule-based detection of malicious behavior, and context-aware harmful content detection. The system processes incoming prompts before their processing by the LLM application. Malicious prompts are blocked automatically, and safe prompts are passed through. The deployed system further enhances prompt detection with threat signature generation and threat intelligence management. Where there are any detected threats, SHA-256 signature is generated and the associated threat intelligence is maintained using the Threat Registry API. Blockchain verification is employed to ensure a tamperproof record of any registered threats.
Through functional testing of the deployed system, it was found that the allowed safe prompts and malicious prompt-injection cases could both be detected and blocked. In the functional testing process, the following types of attack scenarios were tested for successful threat detection: Instruction Override, Jailbreak, and Data Extraction. Threat storage and retrieval, as well as signature generation and threat verification through blockchain technology were also successfully demonstrated. SentinelChain combines AI-based detection, automated firewall enforcement, cryptographic threat identification, threat registry management, and blockchain verification into a security framework for LLM-integrated applications.

8.2 Contributions

Contributions of SentinelChain are as follows:

a. Prompt Injection Detection via AI-Based Approach: The analysis performed via DistilBERT model is combined with security checks based on rules to detect potentially malicious prompts.
b. Contextual Detection of Prompts: The system takes into account the context of the prompts to discriminate between malicious prompts and normal prompts that contain security-related or dangerous terms.
c. Automated Blocking of Detected Prompts: Detected malicious prompts are automatically blocked before being delivered to the target LLM application.
d. Prompt Safe Handling: Safe prompts are let through the system.
e. Threat Signatures via Cryptography: The SHA-256 algorithm is utilized for the purpose of generating signatures for detected threats, which serves as an identifier of threat record.
f. Threat Storage: The detected threats can be stored and subsequently fetched via Threat Registry API.
g. Blockchain-based Verification: The process of integrating threat signatures into the blockchain-based registry enables threat records to be verified.
h. Security Framework Integration: SentinelChain integrates prompt detection and blocking, threat signature generation, threat storage, and verification through the blockchain within a single framework.

8.3 Limitations

a. Even though SentinelChain manages to showcase an effective implementation of prompt detection using artificial intelligence and threat intelligence based on blockchain technology, there are still some limitations associated with it.
b. Lack of Evaluation Cases: While the functional evaluation conducted includes several cases, it is not enough to make sure that the results obtained apply to the whole population of prompts in general.
c. Dependence on Detection Technologies: It is important to note that the effectiveness of the technology used is determined by the performance of DistilBERT, rule-based detection, and context-based analysis. New attack patterns and wording will have to be tested separately.
d. Context Ambiguity: There are some cases where prompts are related to security while being utilized for educational and research purposes. Even though context-based detection is implemented, it is hard to distinguish malicious intent from legitimate one.
e. Limited Coverage of Attacks: At the moment the implemented testing covers only those kinds of attacks which are included into demonstration of prompt injection such as instruction override, jailbreak, and data extraction.
f. Blockchain environment: The blockchain part brings more infrastructure and transactions needs. Hence, the current implementation needs to be evaluated further based on a larger environment of multi-organizations.
g. Scalability: The current implementation is a project-based prototype. Further testing and evaluation is needed based on a large number of prompts, organizations, threat records, and blockchain transactions.

8.4 Future Enhancement

The following could be some improvements that should be taken into account when developing SentinelChain further:

a. Bigger and More Diverse Datasets: Expand the dataset used for testing and evaluating the ability to perform prompt injection with more examples of safe, malicious, and potentially ambiguous prompts.
b. Advanced Attacks Detection: Extend the capabilities of the firewall to be able to identify more types of attacks including complex and indirect prompt injections, multistep attacks, obfuscated prompts, or adversarially altered input.
c. Model Continuous Improvement: Implement a mechanism of including newly discovered threats into the training and evaluation process to detect evolving patterns of attacks.
d. Massive Threat Intelligence Exchange: Scale up the registry blockchain technology to allow for more organizations and more exchange of threat information.
e. Performance Improvement: Make the process of model inference and blockchain operations more efficient and suitable for real-time applications.
f. Advanced Threat Analytics: Add more features of identifying attack patterns, frequently used types of threats, and dependencies between threats reported.
g. Advanced Protection from Indirect Prompt Injections: Extend the firewall to analyze the content of external sources such as web pages, documents, emails, and retrieved information before passing it to the LLM.
h. Deployment to Cloud & Production: The architecture can be scaled up from its current implementation at the project level to provide an effective cloud-based security service for multiple LLM applications.

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