Bridging the Gap in Law-Making, Representation and Accountability: Lessons from Nigeria’s National Assembly for Legislative Trust-Building in Emerging Democracies

Abstract

Nigeria’s National Assembly is constitutionally mandated to enact laws, represent citizens, and perform oversight over the executive. Yet, a persistent gap exists between this constitutional design and its institutional delivery, with declining public trust as the principal consequence. This paper adopts a doctrinal methodology, drawing on the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended), statute, case law, and comparative material from South Africa and Kenya, to examine how the National Assembly can build citizens’ trust through the effective performance of its constitutional functions. It advances the argument that the National Assembly holds legislative power as a constructive public trustee of citizens under Section 14(2)(a) of the Constitution, owing corresponding equitable duties of loyalty, prudence, and accountability. Applying this framework, the paper finds that executive dominance, weak oversight, limited public participation, budgetary opacity, and under-utilisation of technology are the principal drivers of the trust deficit. Drawing on the South African and Kenyan constitutional models of institutionalised public participation, it recommends constitutional entrenchment of citizens’ participatory rights, systematic utilisation of existing legislative research institutions, and a governed digital transformation programme as essential reforms for restoring democratic legitimacy. The paper contributes a doctrinal account of the National Assembly as a constructive trustee, a conception not previously applied in the Nigerian legislative scholarship.