Nāgārjuna’s Mādhyamaka Philosophy: Pratītyasamutpāda, Niḥsvabhāvatā And The Logical Establishment Of The Middle Way In The Light of The Mūlamadhyamakakārikā: A Critical Study

Abstract

The present research paper is a text-based critical study of the Mādhyamaka philosophy of ĀcāryaNāgārjuna (approximately second-third century CE). In modern studies Nāgārjuna has been read at times as a śūnyavādin (nihilist), at times as an absolutist, at times as an empiricist and at times as a philosopher of language. Amid these mutually conflicting readings, this paper asks which meaning of ‘śūnyatā’ proves most consistent with the internal logical structure of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (Mūla-mādhyamikakārikā). The method of study is text-critical, interpretive and comparative; the edition of J. W. de Jong (1977) has been taken as the basis for the Sanskrit text, and the traditional interpretation has been checked against Candrakīrti’sPrasannapadā. The principal conclusions of the paper are these: (a) the definition of ‘svabhāva’ given in Mūla-mādhyamikakārikā 15.1-2 is itself the key to understanding śūnyatā; hence śūnyatā is not the negation of things, but the negation of their independent, uncreated and absolute svabhāva; (b) Mūla-mādhyamikakārikā 24.18 binds pratītyasamutpāda, śūnyatā, upādāya-prajñapti and madhyamāpratipad into a single logical thread; (c) the dvisatya framework saves śūnyatā from colliding with ethical and epistemological practice; (d) the use of the catuṣkoṭi is not the establishment of a fifth position, but the refutation of all possibilities of grasping at svabhāva; (e) the ‘non-difference’ of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa should, in essence, be understood in the sense of sameness in svabhāva-śūnyatā, and not in the sense of an identity of substance. The conclusion of the paper is that ‘niḥsvabhāvatā-vāda’ is a more appropriate term than ‘śūnyavāda’ for Nāgārjuna’s system.