The Historical Development of Jaina Pramāṇamīmāṃsā and A Comparative Study of The Pramāṇa Theories of The Major Indian Philosophical Systems

Abstract

This research paper studies the historical development of Jaina pramāṇamīmāṃsā and compares it with the pramāṇa systems of the major Indian philosophies. The basic question is how Jaina thinkers resolved the problem of the validity of knowledge, and where their solution coincides with, and where it diverges from, other traditions. The study is based on historical, text-analytical and comparative methods. There are four principal conclusions. First, Jaina pramāṇaśāstra developed in three stages: the āgamic fivefold classification of knowledge, the pratyakṣa-parokṣa division of the Tattvārthasūtra, and the logical turn of around the eighth century, in which, through Siddhasena Mahāmati and Akalaṅka, a new system of anumāna, hetu and saṃvyavahāra-pratyakṣa came in. Second, in the Jaina tradition the basis of the division of pramāṇas is not the source of knowledge but the immediacy of knowledge (sākṣāttā - with respect to dependence on the senses, etc.), for this very reason, in the original scheme sense-perception is ‘parokṣa’. Third, the distinguishing feature of Jaina epistemology is the linking of pramāṇa with naya, anekānta and syādvāda, from which arises the doctrine of the many-sided nature of things and the relativity of statement. Fourth, on comparison with Buddhism, Nyāya, Sāṃkhya-Yoga, Mīmāṃsā, Vedānta and Cārvāka, the strength of the Jaina view appears in its integrative framework, and its limitations in the two-tiered character of saṃvyavahāra-pratyakṣa, the logical criticisms of syādvāda, and the historical dependence on Buddhist logic. The conclusion of the paper is that it is more appropriate to read Jaina pramāṇamīmāṃsā not merely as a sectarian doctrine, but as an active participant tradition in the dialogue of Indian epistemology.